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FOREWORD
For many Filipinos, the realization of the vision of having and
owning a decent structure which may be called a home has been
somewhatan elusivedream. Although the government has launched
a seriesof housingprogramsover the pastthree decades,the housing
problem hasnot asyet been licked; and the gap betweenthe people's
housingneeds and the supply of housingdoes not seem to have been
reduced, let alone eliminated. The underlying causesare complex.
The most that can be said about the situation is that it hasbeen the
result of many interrelated factors such as rapid population growth,
inadequacy of resources for housing, fragmented approach to
housing, low levelof incomesand savings,etc.
In any event, the governmenthas, in recent years, embarked on a
more active and, hopefully this time around, more coordinated
policy towards housing. To ensure the successof such venture,
more information and data on the demand for and supply of housing,
as well as more analysis of policy issuesinvolving housing, are
required.
It is towards this end that thisstudy was prepared. In this Mono-
graph, Dr. Edna S. Angeles, Research Fellow of the Philippine
Institute for Development Studies, presentsan analysis of the major
aspectsof the supply of and demand for housing, identifies housing
problems and their underlying causes, attempts to estimate the
income and price elasticities of demand for housing, and evaluates
some of the housing policies and programsbeing undertaken by the
government.
It is hoped that this study will Eotonly help in clarifying various
issuesinvolving Philippine housingproblemsbut also provide useful
insights into policy making and planning in this vital sector of our
society.
FILOkOOC! PANTE,JR.
dent
CHAPTER1
INTRODUCTION
The history of national policies on housing in the Philippines
registersa long list of unsuccessfulprograms. Thus, there are still
hundreds of thousandsof people trapped in poor and unacceptable
living conditions today, a problem which remainsunresolvedasever.
The major causes of this problem emanate from the approach to
housing taken by the authorities which is basically fragmented and
uncoordinated. Further, resourcesare insufficient to sustain these
programswhile mismanagementremainswidespread.
The government's responsibility to ensure that every Filipino
enjoys a decent home haslong been accepted asan important aspect
of public policy. This is basicallyhinged on the constitutional man-
date that the state shall "establish, maintain and ensure adequate
social servicesin the field of housing.., to guaranteeenjoyment by
the peopleof adecent standard of living." However, resources,unlike
needs,are limited and competing claims of health and education on
these resourcesmay win out over housing. In this regard, a clear
understanding of the problems of the housing sector is needed to
enable the authorities to formulate a more cohesiveand well-meaning
program on housing. It is along this line that this study was under-
taken.
The housing problem has worsened over the years as evidenced
by the widening gap between the people's housing needs and supply
especially in the 70s. This occurred despite the increasing housing
investments undertaken by both the government and the private
sector. In 1983, for example, total housing investment amounted to
t'4,765 million and this constituted 4.8% of GNP. This increasing
awareness of the seriousness of the problem and the subsequent in-
volvement of both the private and public sectors seemingly had little
impact on researches so there were very few serious attempts to
study the problems of the housing sector that have been recorded.
Likewise, baseline information still remains scarce and difficult to
come by.
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The objective of this study is twofold. The first is to analyze the
major aspects of supply of and demand for housing and in the
process identify specific housing problems and their underlying
causes.This is done by presenting a historical description of the
housingsituation highlightingthe supply and need gap, affordability
of householdsand housingcost. Likewise, an attempt to estimate the
income and price elasticitiesof demand ismade. The other objective
is to review and evaluate some of the housing policies/programs
undertaken by the government specifically the National Shelter
Program.A historicalsketchof the different housingprogramsisalso
presented.
The study is organizedas follows: Chapter 2 presentsthe housing
situation from 1960 to 1980, highlighting on specific aspects of
housing need, affordability and housing cost; Chapter 3 further
analyzes housing demand and an attempt is made to estimate the
income and price elasticities of demand; some theoretical back-
ground on government intervention in housing is presented in
Chapter4 and this is followed by a reviewof the housingprogramsin
the Philippinesin Chapter 5; and, finally, the conclusionand recom-
mendationsare givenin Chapter 6.
CHAPTER2
THE HOUSING SITUATION IN THE PHILIPPINES: 1960-1980
This part of the study presentsthe housingsituation in the Philip-
pinesfrom 1960 to 1980, in terms of basiccensusinformation such
as the housingstock in the country by regionand sector, the type of
structure available, level and type of occupancy, and some measure
of need and effective demand. Some aspects of the residential
construction industry are alsopresented.
Trends andPatterns, 1960-1980
There have been significant increasesin the housingstock in the
Philippinesduring the past three decades.From a total of 4,790,954
dwelling units in 1960, this number has gone up to 8,767,6_4 units
in 1980, reflecting an overall increaseof 83.0% (seeTable 2.1). This
growth rate, however, may beoverstatedon accountof some changes
introduced in the definition of dwelling units used in the latest
census.For example, in the 1960 and1970 Censuses,military camps,
dormitories, hotels and other forms of natural shelter like boats,
caves, etc. were not included in the count. These same structures
were, however, consideredin the 1980 Census.
The regional distribution of the total housingstock indicates the
prominenceof the National Capital Region (NCR) and Region4. The
total number of dwelling units in thesetwo regionsconstituteabout
25% of the total in the country. Region 12 has the least numberof
dwelling units.
In terms of occupancy rate, the highest was recorded in 1970
when only about 1.5% of total dwelling units were found unoccu-
pied. In 1960 and 1980 the occupancyrate was 97% as the figures
show in Table 2.2. Most of theseoccupieddwelling units were classi-
fied as single housesaccountingfor 85% of the total in 1960, 89% in
1970 and 93% in 1980. It should be noted also that some non-
residential structures are being occupiedas dwelling units. From a
total of 41,571 in 1960, this figure went up by 26% in 1970. Favor-
!
TABLE 2.1
NUMBER OF DWELLING UNITS BY REGION: 1960, 1970 & 1980
REGION 1960 1970 1980
NCR 406,071 649,268 1,091,473
1 493,922 515,743 663,208
2 191,184 298,834 413,156
3 437,356 600,337 852,705
4 531,075 706,682 1,132,217
5 396,281 483,982 620,743
6 532,786 596,293 799,408
7 477,389 532,767 719,249
8 383,124 417,845 530,677
9 231,383 304,508 444,429
10 261,285 319,424 498,144
11 333,228 363,704 612,093
12 115,870 310,457 .390,202
PHIL. 4,790,954 6,099,844 8,767,644
Source:1960,1970and1980Censusof PopulationandHousing.
able housing conditions, howeverl brought down the figure to 41,000
in 1980.
More detailed data on occupied dwelling units by type of structure
are given in Table 2.3. In 1960, most of the occupied dwelling units
in all the regions were single houses, with Region 6 registering the
highest number of occupied units. NCR had the mostnumber of
apartments/accessoria indicating the nature of housing accommo-
dations in a highly urbanized area like Metro Manila where a big
rented sector exists. The succeeding decade was characterized by the
same housing Pattern, exceptfor the marked decrease in the number
of barong-barongs in almost-all the regions. There was also a very
sharp increase in the number of occupied duplex and apartment units
in NCR. This was a response to the pressing need for more housing
accommodations in the metropolitan area which has a fast growing
population on account of migratio h. A big jump was likewise evident
in Region 3. Finally in 1980 further decreases in'the number of
barong-barongs were observed formost of the regions except NCR.
TABLE 2.2
NUMBER OF DWELLING UNITS BY TYPE OF BUILDING AND RATE OF OCCUPANCY: 1960, 1970 & 1980
1960 t 970 1980
Un- Un- Un-
Occupied Occupied Occupied
occupied occupied occupied
Residential
Single 3,958,597 5,379,692 7,911,102
Duplex 49,880 144,789 144,024
Apartment/Accesoria 95,801 213,157 320,569
Barong-ba.rong 499,097 220,839 84,131
Sub-total 4,603,375 5,958,477 8,459,826
U1
Other Purposes
Commercial, Industrial,
Agricultural 37,356a 51,361 37,779
lnstitutionat - 993 578
Others 4,2t 5b 6 2,643c
Sub-total 41,571 52,360 41,000
G RAND TOTA L 4,644,946 t42,300 6,010,837 89,007 8,500,826 266,8t 8
Occupancyrate 97.0% 3.0% 98.5% 1.5% 97.0% 3.0%
aCommcrcial only,
btndustrial, Agricultural and Institutional type of buildings are combined with the type. Others since these constiffited less than 0.1% of the
dwelling uni t inventory.
Ctncludes other housing units like natural shelter, boat, etc., hotel, Io6ging house, dormitory, etc., and other collective living quarters (military
camp, etc.).
Source: 1960 & 1970 Census of Population and Housing, and Special Releases, (1983), NCSO.
From 14,435 units in 1970, the number of barong-barongs went up
sharply to 49_159 in NCR. This observation is a reflection of the
increasing problem of squatter and slum dwelling which is usually
resorted to by people who migrate to Metro Manila in search of
better opportunities.
Obviously, Tables 2.3A to 2.3C suggest three major characteristics
of housing in the Philippines: a) A major proportion of all occupied
dwellingunits in each region is composed of single houses with NCR
registering the lowest proportion of about 63.6%; b) NCR shows the
highest growth rate and proportion of apartment/accessoria units to
total occupied dwelling units, although the actual number of apart-
ment units did increase in all the regions over the years; and c) the
number of barong-barongs declined in all the "regions except in NCR
where it sharply increased by more than 200% from 1960 to 1980.
TABLE 2.3A
NUMBER OF OCCUPIED DWELLING UNITS, BY TYPE OF
BUILDING & REGION, 1960
REGION RESIDENTIA L 0 THER PURPOSES
Single Duplex Apartment/ Barong- Commercial Others
Accesoria Barong
NCR 301,743 17,366 58,659 15,862 7 862 695
1 445,482 1,872 7,654 22,496 1 761 365
2 161,747 540 150 21,108 1412 211
3 388,846 2,302 3,281 27,978 2 898 319
4 457,493 3,709 2,432 46,638 3 345 417
5 303,944 2,271 1,243 75,351 3 345 176
6 470,644 4,175 3,578 40,421 2 627 209
7 404,827 1,985 2,101 43,549 3,118 803
8 299,004 1,918 1,098 66,828 2,075 120
9 173,358 2,108 2,263 41,146 1,719 281
10 210,525 3,566 2,680 27,275 2,812 191
11 249,115 4,182 4,131 59,678 3,486 334
12 91,869 3,886 6,531 10,767 672 93
Source:1960CensusofPopulationandHousing,NCSO,
The distribution of housing by sector in the 70s is still reflective
of the concentration of the Philippine population in the rural areas.
69.6% of the country's total occupied housing stock were in the rural
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TABLE 2.3B
NUMBER OF OCCUPIED DWELLING UNITS, BY TYPE OF BUILDING & REGION, 1970
REGION RESIDENTIAL OTHER PURPOSES
Apartment/ Baronp Commercial
Single Duplex Accesori¢ Barong Industrial Institutional Others
Agricultural
NCR 397,668 62,824 147,890 14,435 9,570 306 -
1 470,862 5,261 11,029 19,861 1,921 108 -
2 280,858 3,017 1,090 8,857 2,310 33 1
-.= 3 55t ,662 9,532 14,361 11,731 4,077 84 -
4 620,351 10,376 7,940 54,032 5,369 95 2
5 445,260 3,938 2,087 21,396 3,971 42 --
6 552,403 9,808 4,512 20,775 3,603 43 --
7 500,473 6,206 4,816 11,772 3,282 70 --
8 377,897 4,906 t,612 26,613 2,233 37 2
9 284,198 4,828 2,831 5,450 2,782 18 1
I 0 289,634 6,420 3,968 9,644 3,549 46 -
11 326,639 9,047 6,079 9,418 5,702 78 -
12 281,797 8,626 4,942 6,855 2,992 33 -
Source:1970Censusof PopulationandHousing,NCSO.
TABLE 2.3C
NUMBER OF OCCUPIED DWELLING UNITS, BY TYPE OF BUILDING & REGION, 1980
• Commercial
REGION Totat Single Duplex Apartment/ Barong- Industrial fnstitutional Others*
Accesoria Barong Agricultural
NCR 1,062,174 710,285 51,647 239,131 49,159 11,324 259 369
1 639,186 615,340 4,982 14,229 1,462 1,796 68 309
2 400,414 • 394,573 1,982 1,658 637 1,156 24 384
3 829,699 788,640 11,523 19,426 5,586 3,839 42 643
oo
4 t,099,172 1,049,743 20,578 17,025 7 801 3,799 41 185
5 601,871 591,077 2,899 2,369 2 914 2,537 26 49
6 781,474 766,474 8,364 2,926 1 553 2,084 14 59
7 696,533 681,811 4,655 5,394 2 750 1,813 33 77
8 509,720 503,814 2,496 1_344 1 067 965 7 27
9 433,928 421,453 7,357 2,129 1 898 990 27 74
10 476,819 462,977 6,994 3,260 1 953 t,513 13 109
11 588,525 556,526 11,900 9,640 6 067 4,103 15 274
12 38I ,311 368,389 7,647 2,038 1 284 1,860 9 84
• Includesother housingunits like natural she_ter,boat,etc., hotel lodginghouse,dormitory, etc., andcollective living quarters(military camp,
etc.)
Source:SpecialReleases1983, NCSO.
areas as of 1970 (see Table 2.4). The next decade did not see a big
change in the distribution despite the faster pace of urbanization. In
1980, this proportion went down slightly to 62.8%. In both periods
considered and for all the regions in the country except NCR, the
single type dwelling units are mostly located in the rural areaswhile
there are more apartment and duplex units in urban are.as.A dra-
matic change is observed in the barong-barongs, the number in
urban areas of which far exceeded those in the rural areas in 1980,
which in 1970 was just the opposite. The big jump is easily attribut-
able to the fast rise in the number of urban dwellers in Metro Manila
who migrate from the provinces and who end up squatting and put-
ting up shanties and makeshifts of scrap materials along the fringes
of the metropolis.
Another characteristic of the housing market which is important
especially in relation to the problem of control is the type of occu-
pancy existing in the occupied units. This information is given in
Table 2.5. Three major types of occupancy are considered, namely,
owner-occupied, rented only and rent free. Some reclassification was
done especially for the 19"/0 data since a more detailed classification
with combinations of the three major types was used. Obviously, the
period 1960-1980 was marked by a very sharp.expansion in the rent-
ed sector amounting to :251.8%. The other two types also expe-
rienced an increase with owner-occupied units going up by 67.2%
and rented-free units by 138.1%. From a 6.4% share of total occu-
pied units in 1960, the rented sector's share has evidently grown
continuously to 8.5% in 1970 and 12.3% in 1980. The rent-free
sector did not show a consistent trend having contracted in 1970
from 5.7% to 3.8% and having grown in 1980 to 7.4%. Finally, the
share of o_ner-occupied units slightly declined from 87.9% in 1960
to 87.7% in 1970. This further went down to 80.3% in 1980.
The rented sector's expansion is accounted for mainly by NCR.
With the region's share of the country's rented sector remaining at
more than 50% on the average,actual number of rented units in NCR
increased by 194.5% from 1960 to 1980. Region 4 also had the
.biggest share of owner-occupied units for all the periods considered.
HousingNeeds
A simple measureof housingneed is developedin thisstudy. It is
more limited in definition and does not consideroccupancy density
standard, hence, may be understated compared with other measures
developed earlier. For example, the United Nations suggests the
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TABLE 2.4A
NUMBER OF OCCUPIED DWELLING UNITS, BY TYPE OF BUILDING & REGION, RURAL & URBAN, 1970
Commercial
Apartment/ Barong- Industrial Institutional Others
REGION TO TA L Single Duplex A ccesoria Barong Agricultural
NCR* 632,693 397,668 62,824 147,890 14,435 9,570 306 -
1
Rurat 416,706 389,911 3,299 6,242 16,717 515 22 -
Urban 92,336 80,951 t,962 4,787 3,144 1,406 86 -
2
Rural 256,926 245,614 1,522 526 8,180 1,066 17 1
Urban 39,240 35,244 1,495 564 677 1,244 16 -
3
Rural 402,284 387,735 3,340 2,094 8,032 1,055 28 -
Urban 189,163 163,927 6,192 12,267 3,699 3,022 56 -
4
RuraI 503,291 449,930 3,867 1,200 46,704 1,555 34 1
Urban 194,874 170,421 6,509 6,740 7,328 3,814 61 1
5
Rural 390,432 366,536 1,857 464 19,694 1,864 17 -
Urban 86,262 78,724 2,081 t ,623 1,702 2,107 25 -
6
Rural 447,659 421,813 5,473 1,354 18,046 961 12 -
Urban 143,485 130,590 4,335 3,158 2,729 2,642 31 -
TABLE 2.4A (Continued)
REGION TOTAL Single Duplex Apartment/ Barong- Commercial
Accesoda Barong Industrial Institutional OthersAgricultural
7
Rural 391,514 377,763 2,019 613 10,171 940 8 --
Urban 135,105 122,710 4,187 4,203 1,601 2,342 62 -
8
Rural 337,603 312,527 2,258 450 21,385 963 18 2
Urban 75,697 65,370 2,648 1,162 5,228 1,270 19 -
9
Rural 256,617 246,013 2,921 1,281 4,978 1,411 12 1
Urban 43,491 38,18.5 1,907 1,550 472 1,37t 6 -
lO
Rural 251,438 236,186 3,249 1,552 8,828 1,601 22 -
Urban 61,823 53,448 3,171 2,416 816 1,948 24 -
11
Rural 266,532 250,070 3,724 2,099 8,574 2,038 27 -
Urban 90,421 76,559 5,323 3,980 844 3,664 51 -
12
Rural 263,238 246,102 6,436 2,914 6,464 1,30t 21 -
Urban 42,007 35,695 2,190 2,028 391 1,691 12 -
PHIL.
Rurat 4,184,240 3,930,200 39,965 20,789 t 77,773 15,270 238 5
Urban 1,826,597 1,449,492 104,824 192,368 43,066 36,091 755 1
*Urbanin itsentirety.
Source:1970Censusof PopulationandH_sing_NCS,0.
TABLE 2.4B
NUMBER OF OCCUPIED DWELLING UNITSa, BY TYPE OF BUILDING & REGION, RURAL & URBAN, 1980
Commercial
Apartment/ Boroflg- tndustrief Institutional Others*
REGION TOTAL Single Duplex Accesoria Barong Agricutturat
NCR** 1,O62,174 676,458 56,313 241,178 74,227 12,010 540 1,448
1
Rural 488,788 469,919 3,748 10,076 4,256 445 74 270
Urban 150,398 137,786 3,966 4,667 1,976 1,655 111 237
2
Rural 340,t 07 332,506 2,013 1,224 3,136 541 20 667
Urban 60,307 56,049 973 1,310 797 1,103 30 45IJ 3
Rural 475,938 455,751 5,326 3,327 10,549 577 39 369
Urban 353,761 312,824 9,238 18,724 8,092 3,890 166 827
4
Rural 694,031 667,570 7,630 2,166 14,826 1,300 66 473
Urban 405,151 352,245 19,104 17,866 11,909 3,433 97 487
5
Rural 473,886 458,467 1,848 480 12,044 710 40 297
Urban t 27,985 117,427 3,115 2,373 2,284 2,598 69 119
6
Rural 568,108 558,282 6,263 869 2,153 361 18 162
Urban 213,366 199,835 6,219 2,767 1,681 2,616 6t 187
7
Rurab 480,794 472,789 2,291 1,157 3,935 477 5 140
Urban 215,739 198,773 5,505 5,717 3,431 2,088 65 160
8
Rural 403,517 395,813 2,985 606 3,648 309 2I 135
Urban 106,203 100,020 2,282 1,295 1,489 979 28 110
9
Rural 361,878 351,307 5,649 1,130 3,160 256 18 358
Urban 72,050 64,006 4,608 1,218 920 1,149 37 112
t0
Rural 351,422 340,894 4,454 853 4,448 413 14 346
Urban 125,397 111,193 6,709 3,600 1,642 1,714 86 453
11
Rural 390,011 371,548 4,460 4,241 8,643 829 10 280
Urban 198,5t4 171,765 11,459 6,321 4,912 3,413 493 151
12
•-' Rural 311,929 299,226 8,423 1,255 2,406 490 33 96w
Urban 69,382 62,366 3,332 1,144 748 1,601 49 142
PHIL.
Rural 5,340,409 5,174,072 55,090 27,384 73,204 6,708 358 3,593
Urban 3,160,417 2,560,'/47 132,823 308,180 114,108 38,249 1,832 4,478
TOTAL 8,500,826 7,734,819 187,913 335,564 187,312 44,957 2,190 8,071
• Includesotherhousingunitslike naturalshetter,boat,etc.,hotellodginghouse,dormitory,etc.,andothercollectivelivingquarters(military
camp,etc.).
• *Urbaninitsentirety.
Source:1980Censusof PopulationandHousing,NCSO.
aThesefigureswereesUmatedusingt_enumberof dwellingunitsperhouseholdby sectorandregionsinceno detaileddataby sectorfor
•1980wereavailableat thetimet_estudywasconducted.
TABLE 2.5A
NUMBER OF OCCUPIED DWELLING UNITS
BY TYPE OF OCCUPANCY AND REGION, 1960
Owner - Rented Rent
Region Occ. Percent Only Percent Free Percent
NCR 211,107 5.2 170,341 57.4 20,739 7.9
1 445,745 10.9 13,359 4.5 20,526 7.8
2 177,427 4.3 2,255 0.8 5,486 2.1
3 395,448 9.7 14,303 4.8 15,873 6.0
4 466,885 11.4 16,403 5.5 30,970 11.8
5 358,222 8.8 9,236 3.1 18,872 7.2
6 464,912 11.4 12,586 4.2 44,156 16.8
7 428,011 10.5 14,985 5.1 13,387 5.1
8 348,994 8.5 8,993 3.0 13,056 4.9
9 200,346 4.9 7,162 2.4 13,367 5.1
10 220,378 5.4 10,381 3.5 16,291 6.2
11 288,365 7.1 13,681 4.6 18,880 7.2
12 79,001 1.9 2,912 1.0 31,905 12.1
PHIL. 4,084,841 100.0 296,597 100.0 263,508 100.0
Source:1960Censusof PopulationandHousing,NCSO.
following principal components of housing needs for a particular
period:
(1) The number of dwelling units required for householdswithout
shelter, householdsoccupying living quarters of an unacceptabletype,
householdsinvoluntarily doubled-upwith other householdsin living quar-
ters of an acceptabletype, and for reductionin levelsof density in accept-
ablelivingquartersto adesiredlevel;and
(2) number of living quarterswhich are of an acceptabletype but in
needof repairor replacement.1
Obviously, it is difficult to use this definition on account of the
very limited housing data we have at present.
The definition of housing need used here is the number of dwel-
ling units required for households who are occupying structures
which are not intended or not suitable for human habitation plus
the number of dwelling units needed to achieve the ideal condition
1. See Ramos (1980), p. 2.
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TABLE 2.5B
NUMBER OF OCCUPIED DWELLING UNITS
BY TYPE OF OCCUPANCY AND REGION, 1970
Rented Rent
Region Owner - Percent Percent Percent
Occ. Only Free
NCR 302,722 5.7 299,953 58.7 30,018 13.2
1 479,521 9.1 14,600 2.8 14,921 6.6
2 285,734 5.4 4,880 0.9 5,552 2.4
3 541,405 10.3 35,718 6.0 14,324 6.3
4 642,830 12.2 30,035 5.9 25,300 11.I
5 452,806 8.6 11,820 2.3 12,068 5.3
6 534,747 10.1 15,587 3.0 40,810 7.0
7 490,048 9.3 23,594 4.6 12,977 5.7
8 392,298 7.4 10,088 1.0 10,914 4.8
9 280,096 5.3 9,629 1.9 10,383 4.6
10 281,865 5.3 16,216 3.2 15,180 6.7
11 312,846 5.9 27,360 5.4 16,747 7.4
12 275,796 5.2 11,682 2.3 17,767 7.8
PHIL. 5,272,714 100 511,162 100 226,961 100
Source: ] 970 Census of Population and Housing, NCSO.
of one household occupying one dwelling unit, i.e., no doubled-up
households.
Tables 2.6A and 2.6B provide information on the total housing
need in 1970 and 1980. A total of 698,689 dwelling units were
needed in 1970 to enable each household in the country to occupy
an acceptable housing unit. This served as backlog in addition to the
need for more units brought about by the increase in the number of
households in the 80s. However, it seems that the housing sector
improved especially with the introduction of more innovative shelter
programs since a remarkable decline of 49.0% was registered in
the measure of need in 1980. The number of households in occupied
dwelling units had gone up by 39.6% and total acceptable dwelling
units had risen faster by 46.8%.
In terms of the regional distribution of this gap between the
supply of acceptable dwelling units and the actual need, Region 4
took the lead in 1970 followed by NCR. Region 9 had the least need
for housing during the same period. In 1980, except for NCR which
15
TABLE 2.$C
NUMBER OF OCCUPIED DWELLING UNITS
BY TYPE OF OCCUPANCY AND REGION, 1980
Owner - Rented Rent
Region Occ. Percent Only Percent Free Percent
NCR 449,905 6.6 501,725 48.1 110,544 17.6
1 566,384 8.3 30,539 2.9 42,263 6.7
2 364,269 5.3 15,350 1.5 20,795 3.3
3 697,036 10.2 80,394 7.7 52,269 8.3
4 926,128 13.6 98,671 9.4 74,373 11.8
5 533,810 7.8 36,119 3.5 31,942 5.1
6 659,617 9.6 47,126 4.5 74,731 11.9
7 611,I88 8.9 50,201 4.8 35,144 5.6
8 459,693 6.7 22,772 2.2 27,255 4.3
9 374,386 5.5 29,466 2.8 30,076 4.8
10 398,534 5.8 38,909 3.7 39,376 6.3
11 469,341 6.9 66,667 6.4 52,517 8.4
12 319,630 4.7 25,614 2.4 36,067 5.7
PHIL. 6,829,919 IO0 1,043,552 I00 627,349 1O0
Source:1970CensusofPopulationandHousing,NCSO.
experienced a deterioration in its housing situation with total need
increasing by 86.3%, the rest of the regions saw the narrowing of
the gap by an average of 67.4%. This clearly suggests the concen-
tration of unacceptable dwelling units and doubled-up families in
NCR during the 80s.
To confirm this we look at the occupancy rate which is defined
here as the ratio of households to occupied dwelling units and the
number of persons per dwelling unit (see Tables 2.7A and 2.7B).
In 1970, there were 1,026 households for every 1,000 dwelling units
for the whole Philippines. This figure suggeststhat there were on the
average 26 households who were doubling-up with other households.
On the average also, there were about 6 persons to a dwelling unit.
The situation is even more difficult if we do not allow occupancy in
unacceptable dwelling units (as defined in this study). This means
that 74 households would have had to double-up accommodation.
This would have meant more persons occupying a dwelling unit. At
the regional level, overcrowding is evident in NCR with an occupancy
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TABLE 2,6A
PHILIPPINE HOUSING NEED BY REGION, 1970
(DU-DU')
Region # DU # DU4" DU-DU_ # HH HH-DU_ +
(HH-DU*)
NCR 632,693 608,382 24,311 671,901 63,519 87,830
1 509,042 487,152 21,890 524,259 37,107 58,997
2 296,166 294,965 11,201 302,590 17,625 28,826
3 591,447 575,555 15,892 600,592 25,037 40,929
4 698,165 638,667 59,498 712,052 73,385 132,883
5 476,694 451,285 25,409 482,442 31,157 56,566
6 591.144 566,723 24,421 603,408 36,685 61,106
7 526,619 511,495 15,124 531,590 20,095 35,219
8 413,300 384,415 28,885 416,948 32,533 61,418
9 300,108 291,857 8,251 308,742 16,885 25,136
10 313,261 300,022 13,239 319,716 19,694 32,933
11 356,953 341,755 15,198 364,846 23,091 38,289
12 305,245 295,365 9,880 324,042 28,677 38,557
PHIL. 6,010,837 5,737,638 273,199 6,163,128 425,490 698,689
*Does not include barong-barong and non-r©sidontlaJbuildings.
Source: 1970 Censusof Population and Housing, NCSO.
rate of 1,062 to 1,000 dwelling units and an average of 7 persons
occupying a dwelling unit.
A better picture is presented by the figures in 1980 with the
occupancy rate going down to 1,012 households per 1,000 dwelling
units and the number of persons to a unit going down to about 5.
Similar declines are observed in all the regions, with NCR still
remaining the region with the most number of doubled-up families.
Family Income and Expenditures for Housing
The share of housing to total family expenditures has in the 70s
remained the second or third largest among several items considered,
the major ones of whicl_ are food and clothing (Table 2.8). Its share
has gone up from 9.4% in 1971 to 10.1% in 1979. If we consider
other housing-related items like furnishing and equipment, household
operations and fuel, light and water, we notice a decreasing share of
these items over the years except for fuel, light and water whose
17
TABLE 2.6B
PHILIPPINE HOUSING NEED BY REGION, 1980
(DU-DU _')
Region # DU # DU* DU-DU* # HH HH-DU* +
(HH-DU*)
NCR 1,062,174 1,001,063 61,111 1,103,563 102,500 163,611
1 639,186 635,551 3,635 651,070 15,519 19,154
2 400,414 398,213 2,201 404,037 5,824 8,025
3 829,699 819,589 10,110 838,045 18,456 28,566
4 1,099,172 1,087,346 11,826 1,107,031 19,685 31,511
5 601,871 596,345 5,526 603,807 7,462 12,988
6 781,474 777,764 3,710 786,881 9,117 12,827
7 696,533 691,860 4,673 698,105 6,245 10,918
8 509,720 507,654 2,066 511,107 3,453 5,519
9 433,928 430,939 2,989 438,878 7,939 10,928
10 476,819 473,231 3,588 479,504 6,273 9,861
11 588,525 578,066 10,459 591,896 13,830 24,289
12 381,311 378,074 3,237 393,263 15,189 18,426
PHIL. 8,500,826 8,375,695 125,131 8,607,187 231,492 356,623
*Does not Include barong-barong and non-residential buildings.
Source: 1980 Census of Population and Housing, NCSO.
share increased in 1975. Total share of these items consistently
decreased from 17.7% in 1971 to 15.1% in 1979.
As a proportion of total personal consumption expenditures,
the share of housing expenditures has been going up (Table 2.9).
From 17.7% in 1977, it has consistently increased to 18.6% in 1980,
with fuel, light and water accounting for most of the increase.
The distribution of income as of 1979 reveals the existence of
still a large proportion of the population belonging to the low and
middle income classes. Table 2.10 reveals that more than 50% of
total households receive annual incomes of less than 1_6,000, which
on a monthly basis, would amount to only t_500 or less a month.
Following the categories used by Osorio (1983), 2 about 88% of total
2. The following income classification is used in Osorio (1983):
1. low - lessthan _4,000.
2. middle - fJ4,000 but lessthan _20,000.
3. high - _20,000 hut lessthan @k100,000.
4. very high -tP100,000 and over.
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households belong to the low and middle income groups, with the
former accounting for about 36% of the total.
Housing Cost
The capability of households to afford house construction is not
only determined by their level of income and their ability to borrow.
Equally important is the price of housing made available to prospect-
ive homeowners or renters, and this is to a great extent determined
by the cost of constructing a housing unit.
Cost of housing has evidently gone up as shown in Table 2.1_1.
For the whole Philippines, and for all types of units, the cost per
square meter was t_454 in 1977 and this went up tot=1,101 in 1983,
registering an increase of 142.5%. A similar trend is observed in all
the regions with NCR posting the highest cost per square meter. Very
sharp increases in cost are also noticed in most of the regions. Exclu-
ding NCR, the average cost per square meter for the twelve regions in
TABLE 2.7A
OCCUPANCY RATE AND NUMBER OF PERSONSPER DWELLING
UNIT BY REGION, 1970
HH per HH per POP/DU POP/DU*Region 1,000 DU 1,000 DU*
NCR 1,062 1,104 6.7551 7.0251
1 1,038 1,076 5.9214 6.1389
2 1,022 1,062 5.7134 5.9380
3 1,015 1,044 6.1130 6.2818
4 1,020 1,115 5.9429 6.4965
5 1,012 1,069 6.2239 6.5743
6 1,021 1,065 6.1209 6.3846
7 1 009 1,039 5.7588 5.9291
8 1 009 1,085 5.7619 6.1949
9 1029 1,058 6.5610 6.4039
10 1 021 1,066 6.2336 6.5086
11 1022 1,068 6.1653 6.4395
12 1 062 1,097 6.3603 6,5731
PHIL. ,026 1,074 6.1071 6.3936
*DoesnotIncludebarong-baron8_ndnon-residentialbuildings.
Source:1970CensusofPopulationandHousing,NCSO.
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TABLE 2.7B
OCCUPANCY RATE AND NUMBER OF PERSONSPER DWELLING
UNIT BY REGION, 1980
Region HH per HI-/per POP/DU POP/DU*
I,O00 OU 1,000 DU*
NCR 1,039 1,102 6.1020 6.4745
1 1,019 1,024 5.5397 5.5714
2 1,009 1,015 5.5331 5.5637
3 1,010 1,022 5.7886 5.8600
4 1,007 1,018 5.0612 5.1162
5 1,003 1,012 5.7770 5.8305
6 1,007 1,012 5.7911 5.8187
7 1,002 1,009 5.4375 5.4740
8 1,003 1,007 5.4923 5.5164
9 1,011 1,018 5.8270 5.8674
10 1,006 1,013 5.7862 5.8301
11 1,006 1,024 5.6868 5.7896
12 1,031 1,040 5.9556 6.0066
PHIL. 1,012 1,028 5.6581 5.7426
*Does not include barong-barong and non.residentlaJ buildings.
Source: 1980 Census of Population and Housing, NCSO.
1977 was only about t_299. This increased sharply to P938 in 1983.
In NCR, this cost figure moved from f_629/sq, meter in 1977 to
t_1,196/sq, meter in 1983, a jump of about 90%. Cost figures by type
of building generally exhibit the same behavior (see Annexes B1 to
B3).
In the rented sector_ rental prices have also been increasing. The
rental price index for NCR indicates a continuous increase from
1972 to 1983 (Table 2.12) with an average rate of 11.8%. High
rates of increase are observed especially in 1973-1974 and 1981-
1983 periods. These periods marked the onset of the two oil shocks
which brought about rapid increases in commodity prices, including
construction materials. We notice from Table 2.12, for example, the
very sharp increases in the price index of construction materials and
in the price index of housing repairs in Table 2.13. These changes un-
doubtedly brought about the increase in the cost of housing and
rental prices.
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TABLE 2.8
PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE
BY ITEM OF EXPENDITURE, 1971, 1975 AND 1979
Percent Percent Percent
Item Distrl- Rank Distri- Rank Dlstri- Rank
butlon bution bution
Food 53.7 1 57.0 1 31.3 1
Clothing, Footwear
and other wear 6.2 3 7.5 3 3.7 7
Alcoholic beverages .... 0.7 14
Tobacco, cigarette .... 0.8 13
Housing 9.4 2 8.5 2 10.1 3
Housing Furnishingand
Equipment 2.3 9 1.9 9 1.3 11
Household Operations 2.4 8 2.1 7 1.1 12
Fuel, light & water 3.6 5 4.6 4 2.6 8
PersonalCare 1.6 11 1.8 10 0.5 16
Medical Care 1.8 10 1.9 9 2.2 9
Transport and communi-
cation 2.9 6 3.4 6 5.1 5
Recreation 1.8 10 1.4 12 0.8 13
Education 3.7 4 4.0 5 3.9 6
Gifts, contributions and
Assistanceto outsiders 0.6 13 0.4 14 25.3 2
Taxes paid 0.3 14 1.0 13 1.5 10
Special occasionsof
family 2.5 7 2.0 8 1.5 10
PersonalEffects 0.6 13 1.0 13 0.2 17
Miscellaneousgoodsand
services 1.5 12 1.5 11 8.9 4
Others ......
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 ]00.0
Source: NCSO and Osorio, Nieves, 1983, "The 1979 Diary Family Income and Expen-
diture Survey: Experience and Preliminary Results," Journal of Philippine Deve-
lopment, VoI. X, No. 1,1st sem., p. 150.
However, one observation needs to be raised at this point. Des-
pite the big jump in the housing repair index, the rate of increase in
the cost of housing is tremendously higher than the rate of increase
in rental prices. This may have been brought about by the rent
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TABLE 2.9
PERCENTAGE SHARE OF HOUSING EXPENDITURES
TO TOTAL PERSONALCONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES,
1977-1980
Item 1977 1978 1979 1980
TOTAL 17.7 17.9 17.2 18.6
Housing 7.4 7.4 7.5 7.4
Fuel, Light andWater 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.8
HouseholdFurnishingand
Equipment 4.9 4.3 4.8 4.7
HouseholdOperations 2.4 2.6 2.6 2.7
Source: ESIA/WID, Social Development in the Philippines 1970-1980, P. 172.
TABLE 2.10
PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLDS
BY INCOME LEVELS, 1979
CumulativeAnnual Income Distribution
Percentage
Lessthan 2,000 15.65 15.65
2,000 - 3,999 20.58 36.23
4,000 - 5,999 16.56 52.79
6,000 - 7,999 10.01 62.80
8,000 - 9,999 8.23 71.03
10,000 - 19,999 16.68 87.71
20,000 - 29,999 5.17 92.88
30,000 - 49,999 4.14 97.02
50,000 - 59,999 0.85 97.87
60,000 - 79,999 0.79 98.66
80,000 - 99,999 0.48 99.14
100,000 - 199,999 0.53 99.67
200,000 - 499,999 0.19 99.86
500,000 - 999,999 0.06 99.92
1,000,000 and over 0.01 99.93
Source: Nieves Osorio, "The 1979 Diary Family Income and Expenditure Survey: Expe-
rience and Preliminary Results," in JournalofPhillpplne Development, Vol. X, No.
1, 1st sem. 1983, p. 148.
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TABLE 2.11
TOTAL NUMBER AND COST PER SQUARE METER OF RESIDENTIAL BUILDINGS
CONSTRUCTED BY REGION, I977-1983
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983_
Total # Cost Total # Cost Total # Cost Total # Cost Tote/# Cost Total # Cost Total # Cost
Region t 1,957 333 683 447 1,092 645 9t6 840 1,172 877 1,021 891 722 957
Region II 949 247 295 495 480 616 771 759 51 7 854 439 865 296 897
Region I1[ 1,569 370 1,122 562 2,058 672 t,807 862 2,322 862 2,744 1,022 1,659 1,027
Region IV 3,772 394 1,713 595 2,384 729 2,897 845 2,856 943 2,875 1,102 2,058 1,075
ba Region V 788 264 406 451 545 611 628 733 598 883 472 925 496 1,051
_o Region V I 1,243 330 1,174 502 1,249 618 1,182 782 1,091 875 805 883 525 927
Region Vll 1,922 407 865 501 1,468 606 1,009 697 1,407 807 1,465 800 738 808
Region Vlll 1,275 170 493 489 74t 556 842 715 897 758 684 770 514 1,039
Region IX 1,006 235 676 496 807 641 798 748 589 756 395 841 237 839
Region X 2,096 257 785 387 1,195 515 1,236 688 1,292 716 930 766 483 745
Region Xt 1,534 293 1,228 523 1,781 735 1,484 833 2,513 853 2,942 1,127 1,715 983
Region Xtl 677 290 417 397 756 611 1,536 771 613 780 487 812 288 911
NCR 4,295 629 4,868 755 7,197 956 8,834 1,066 7,910 1,180 11,092 1,201 7,858 1,196
Philippines 23,083 454 14,725 6,317 21,753 786 23,940 916 23,777 t,000 26,351 1,093 17,589 t,101
*For thefirst two quartersonly.
Source;ConstructionDivision,NCSO.
TABLE 2.12
RENTAL INDEX, NCR
1972-1983
Year Index Growth Rate
1972 57.0
1973 68.0 19.3
1974 78.3 15.I
1975 83.4 6.5
1976 87.2 4.5
1977 93.4 7.1
1978 100.0 13.2
1979 113.2 8.8
1980 123.2 12.0
1981 138.0 17.0
1982 162.7 17.9
1983 191.6 17.8
Ave: 11.8
TABLE 2.13
PRICE INDEX OF HOUSING REPAIRS
(1972 = 100)
Year Price Index
1972 I00.0
1973 127.6
1974 174.1
1975 182.I
1976 218.5
1977 254.8
1978 272.8
1979 337.7
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control law3 which has remained in operation until today. The maxi-
mum annual increase of 10% of all units being leased at _'300 and
below provided by the rent control policy has definitely hampered
the increase in rental prices dictated by the market. Likewise, the
prolonged effectivity of the rent regulation may have resulted in the
undermaintenance of apartment units which when vacated will defi-
nitely not command the market rental rate.
The discussion presented above provides us a clear perspective of
the housing situation in the Philippines. This enables us to identify
the problems which confront the sector today, as well as their under-
lying causes.The following problems of housing clearly surfaced:
a) there is a significant amount of backlog in housing and un-
less a faster rate of construction and improvement activities
is undertaken, an increasingly wider gap between housing
need and supply will occur;
b) most of our people still earn very low incomes to allow them
to acquire housing or to borrow; and
c) housing cost is increasing very rapidly thereby making
housing less and less affordable especially to the low income
families.
3. P.D. No. 20 in effect froze monthly rentals of dwelling units leased at _300 per
month and below. Batas Pambansa Big. 2S further extended the effectivity of P.D, No. 20
for a duration of five years beginning April 1979 but allowing the annual increase of 10%.
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CHAPTER 3
THE DEMAND FOR HOUSING IN THE PHILIPPINES
Past studies on housing,in the Philippines have focused mainly on
the estimation of housing need.4 Very few attempts to analyze the
demand for housing have been recorded and if there are, they are
limited to simple comparisons of households' incomes and the
current cost of dwelling units (Tan, 1979) signifying the affordability
levels of households.To date, no empirical work is available which
analyzes how people's demand for housing responds to changesin
income and prices. Information on these two variables and their
effects on housing demand are considered extremely important in
drawing up policies directed at offering massive low-cost housing and
providing subsidies to low-income families. While such importance
is recognized, the need for technical information remains unfulfilled
mainly because of the unavailability of appropriate data as well as
the complexity of the concept of housing, which renders it difficult
to study.
It is the purpose of this part of the study to investigate the effect
of changes in income on the demand for housing using household
survey data. The next section reviews and discusses past studies
mostly done in the United States, and some conceptual issues. Final-
ly, the last section presents the data, the analytic model and the
results.
Review of Past Studies and Some Theoretical and Methodological
Issues
Considered as major determinants of demand for housingare in-
come and housing prices. The estimation of income and price elasti-
cities are therefore the focus of most demand for housing analyses.
4. NEDA broadly defines housing need as the quantity of dwelling units that still
have to be constructed to provide each household or family with a separate dwelling. Also
included in this definition are the dwelling units needed to replace those considered unsuit-
able for occupancy (i.e., dilapidated "barong.barong").
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Past studies of the demand for housing reveal a wide margin of
uncertainty about the responsiveness of the demand for housing
with respect to changes in income and prices. For example, estimates
of the income elasticity of the demand for housing in the US range
from 0.4 to 2.1 (de Leeuw, 1971 ). This wide range makes it difficult
to draw definite conclusions as to whether the demand is elastic or
inelastic with respect to income, more so to justify the introduction
of specific housing policies as well as make conclusions about past
policies.
Inconsistency of results has been a problem even as early as the
1960s (Winger, 1968) and has been mainly attributed to the differing
notions of the nature of the fundamental relationship between two
variables. Winger (1968) points out the case of studies using models
assuming a direct relationship between income and housing which is
deemed inappropriate when the focus is on the housing consumption
of homeowners. Current housing expenditures are largely a reflection
of a decision made sometime in the past when the house was pur-
chased. This decision is to a large extent affected by the availability
and cost of mortgage credit at the time the decision to buy a house is
made and so Winger proposes the inclusion of credit factors in the
analysis, distinct and separate from income.
A more fundamental problem involves the operational definition
of housing service which is oftentimes used very loosely in studies on
housing. Olsen (1969) suggests that this concep% basically an unob-
servable theoretical entity, refers to the good which each dwelling (or
housing) unit yields per unit of time and to which consumers attach
value. A dwelling unit on the other hand is a package composed of a
certain quantity of capital asset called housing stock. Taken in this
context, Olsen argues that if "we observe that one dwelling unit sells
for twice the amount of another dwelling unit in the same market,
then we say that the more expensive unit contains twice the quantity
of housing stock and, hence, involves twice the total expenditure"
(Olsen, 1971, p. 64). Similarly, in the case of a dwelling unit which
rents for twice the amount of another dwelling unit, it follows that
the more expensive dwelling unit yeilds twice the quantity of
housing service per time period and, hence, involves twice the total
expenditure per time period. These definitions would allow research-
ers to compare the relative amounts of housing service yielded by
different dwelling units despite the fact that these two concepts are
not directly observable, and hence not directly quantifiable.
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More recent studies, however, point to two major problems
which account for the existence of the different values obtained
for income and price elasticities. One is the useof current measured
income in the analysis instead of the permanent or long-run expected
income, which, as has been pointed out in many studies, underesti-
mates the value of the income elasticity (e.g., Carliner, 1973; Lee and
Kong, 19"/7; de Leeuw, 1971 ). The other problems arisesfrom the use
of grouped instead of micro household observations in the cross-
section analyses of housing demand. The use of grouped data,
although primarily employed to avoid the problem encountered in
using current income, results in various aggregation biases in esti-
mating demand elasticities (see Lee, 1968; Vaughn, 1976; Polinsky,
1976; Maisel et al., 1971 ).
Other methodological problems pointed out in housing demand
studies include the possible exclusion of movers in the sample being
analyzed and the non-treatment of imputed rent in measuresof home-
owner income. Specifically, de Leeuw (1971) expresses skepticism
over the results of some studies (i.e., Lee, 1963) becauseof this prob-
lem. Likewise, Carliner (1973) argues that it seems plausible that
families who have not changed their house might have experienced
changes in their permanent income and that therefore the correlation
between income and housing consumption might be lower for non-
movers than for movers.
An attempt to reconcile these varying results by introducing
some adjustments specifically in relation to the concepts and popu-
lation used in different studies is the work of de Leeuw (1971). The
omission of rental value of homes from homeowner's income, for
example, results in a bias in the elasticity estimate for homeowners,
away from l.S Hence, if the true elasticity is lessthan one, the omis-
sion of rental value will tend toreduce the estimated elasticity below
the true value, while if it is above one, the omission of rental value
will tend to raise the estimated elasticity above the true value.
Likewise, he proposes an adjustment of 15 to 20 percent to con-
vert elasticities of market value to elasticities of annual housing
expense with respect to income. Hence, Muth's (1960) estimated
income elasticity of 1.68 is adjusted to the neighborhood of 1.35.
Other studies are also considered (e.g., Winger, 1968; Reid, 1962;
Lee, 1968) and similar adjustments are introduced rendering the esti-
5, De Leeuw estimates this bias to amount to 10 times the difference between the esti-
mated elasticity and 1.0 in percentage terms. For a detailed discussion of the derivation of
the formula, please see De Leeuw (1971), p. 3.
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mated income elasticity for rental housing in the United States to fall
within the range of 0.8 to 1.0. For owner-occupants, corrected esti-
mates range from 0.7 to 1.5.
Another work done along this line is by Polinsky (1977). He tries
to explain differences in results in terms of specification errors. He
mentions in particular the biases inherent in the income elasticity
estimated when the price variable term in the demand equation is
omitted or misspecified (see Quigley, 1979 for a more detailed dis-
cussionof results).
One other methodological innovation which has been tackled
especially in the studiesof Reid (1962), de Leeuw (1971), Lee and
Kong (1977), and Follain et al. (1980) is the separate analysisdone
for two sub-samples composed of renters and homeowners. The
resultsof these studiesconsistently indicate that the income elasticity
for owner-occupied housing is higher than that for rental housing.
Similar problems are encountered in the estimation of the price
elasticity of demand, the major one of which isthe measurementof
the price variable itself, in the housing market, "prices" are not
directly observable. Market transactions do produce monthly rent
correspondingto flows of housingserviceor market valuesfor stocks
of housingcapital, but neither of thesevariab'esgivesusthe price.
Several measuresof price are being used in housing demand
studies and this partly explains why a wide rangeof elasticity esti-
mates surface. Quigley (1979) reports this range to be from about
--0.3 to -0.9.
While extensive discussions and numerous studies are being
undertaken in the United States to improve the validity of price and
income elasticity estimates obtained in past studies,very little effort
to undertake similar studies isobserved in developing countries. This
sad state remainsunattended despitethe greater needfor more accu-
rate estimates in this part of the world where more severehousing
problems and very scarceresourcesexist. A noteworthy attempt has,
however, been recorded in Korea (Follain et al., 1980) and the
results indicate conclusively that both the price and incomeelastici-
ties of the demand for housingservicesin Korea are comparableto
those found in the United States. The income elasticity is negative
and smaller than one in absolute value. This result is intriguing con-
sideringthe very wide margin in eachcountry's per capita incomeof
$700 for Korea and $7,800 for the United Statesin 1976. Likewise,
the figures obtained can very well serveas points of reference to
which Philippine estimatescan be compared.
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Data and Notations
There is strictly no extensive housingsurvey in the Philippines
which can readily facilitate the analysisof housingdemand congruent
with the general ideasespoused in past housingstudiesdone in the
United States and other countries. What is used in this study is a
small survey conducted among membersof the Home Development
Mutual Fund (or Pag-IBIG) by HDMF during the second quarter of
1983. This specific survey was chosen on account of the detailed
questions asked on the economicand financial profile of the Fund
members.6 Also, since the target population of the Government's
shelter program are the low and middle-income families, this sample
allows the study of the behaviorof housingexpenditure with respect
to changesin income among this group since the members of the
Fund are supposedlyin the group of low and middle income families.
The survey included 3,457 observations7 both from the private
and government sectors and aside from the economic and financial
profile of Fund members, the survey also included questionson the
members' knowledge, accessto information, and general impression
about the Fund. Respondentscome from all the regions in the
country with NCR classifiedunder Region4.
For purposesof this study, a sample of 1,344 observationswas
drawn based on the list of variables included in the analysis. In
effect, the observations include only those respondentswho gave
complete information on the variables under consideration. The
list of variablesand their notations is shownin Table 3.1.
The Analytic Model
The estimation model utilized in this study draws from a family
of models of ho'usingmarkets. Following Follain et al. (1980) the
units of measurement are units of "housing services"and "housing
stock". It is assumed that given some amount of operating inputs,
each unit of housingstock producesone unit of housingservicesper
unit of time (or per period) (seeFollain et al., 1980 and Olsen, 1969).
Housing servicesrefer to the sum of all servicesassociatedwith space
or shelter privacy, security and other features providing comfort
6. The Family Income and Expenditure Survey was initially identified as a major
data source. However, the 1979 data were not available when the study was undertaken.
7. Thls is the number of respondents whose questionnaire sheets were received by the
HDMF as of the end of July 1983. An original sample of" 11,000 was generated through
systematic random sampling using the existing membership of the Fund. However, only 31%
mailed back the accomplished questionnaire.
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TABLE 3.1
LIST OF VARIABLES AND NOTATIONS
R -- monthly rent for renters;,
monthly amortization for homeowners who have outstanding
mortgageloans which were usedfor the purchaseof the housing
unit;
imputed rent for homeownerswho haveno outstandingmortgage
loan, where imputed rent is taken as equivalent to the average
monthly rent of all rentersincludedin the sample;
FY = monthly family income
FC = monthly family consumptionexpenditure
F$ = monthlyfamily saving
P = price
A = age
MS. = Maritalstatus;1 if respondentis married,0 otherwiseI
SJ = ashortageindex which iscomputedas
total numberof households- total numberof dwellingunits
total numberof households
perregion/, wherej = 1.......... 12
generated or provided by a housing unit. 8 Based on this definition,
and given the price per unit of housing services (p), the rent of dwel-
ling unit equals p.q where q refers to the units of housing services
produced by the dwelling unit. Similarly, the value of dwelling unit is
equal to the price per unit of housing stock (P) times the units of
housing stock contained in the dwelling unit (Q). This conceptual
framework is consistent with the discussion of Olsen (1971). The
rent (p.q) and the value of a dwelling unit (P.Q) therefore represent
the expenditure each household or family is willing to incur per
unit of time to derive a given amount of housing services. Hence, in
a demand for housing model, this expenditure measures the effective
demand.
8. A similarconceptualdefinitionwasearlieradoptedin Follainet al. (1980)and
NHMFC(1981).Theprincipaldevelopersof thisfamilyof modelsincludeMills(1967)and
Muth(1960,1964and1971).
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Theoretical and empirical studies allude to various factors that
determine the demand for housing. The major factors include family
income and prices. Other factors, basically socio-demographic, also
include age, marital status, location of residence, family size and
some proxy variables for possible supply shortages (or excess
demand). 9
A discussion of these variables along the lines suggested in the
literature ispresented below as a prelude to the analytic model.
Income. Following consumer behavior theory and considering
competitive conditions, an increase in income leads to an increase in
demand for housing. However, since housing investment involves
considerable amount of resources, it is argued that it requires a big
amount of increase in income before a significant change in the
demand for housing can be observed. In other words, the demand for
housing is expected to be highly income inelastic. Others further
argue that the elasticity coefficient varies between homeowners and
renters (Reid, 19627 de Leeuw, 19717 Follain et al., 1980), with the
latter group generally having lower elasticities than the former.
The choice of the appropriate measure of household income has
been a source of difficulty in almost all housing demand studies. The
argument is that the appropriate measure is not the current rate of
income which is easily measured, but rather the long-run or per-
manent income which is not directly measurable. This is so on
account of the fact that income elasticity estimates using current
period incomes are downward biased when taken in the context of
the permanent income hypothesis (see Theil, 19717 Follain et al.,
1980). Besides, even just considering housing's basic characteristics
of durability and costliness gives us the impression that the relevant
notion of income for analyzing demand is a "normal" or long-run
income (Ouigley, 1979).
Two alternatives for measuring permanent income are available.
One is to use the household level of consumption expenditures and
the reason given for this is that consumption level is likely to be a
good proxy if it is proportional to permanent income. The other al-
ternative which is popularly suggested is to use grouped household
data since transitory components of current income are likely to be
cancelled out when households are grouped by factors unrelated to
transitory income (Follain et al., 1980). For the purpose of this
9. Family size is not included in the analysis since the survey doe9 not include this
variable.
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study, the first alternative is used since the variable can be derived
directly using the survey data.
Price. Just like any normal good, an increase in the price of
housing is expected to reduce the demand for it. Hence we expect
a negative effect of price on the demand for housing. More serious
problems are encountered in the measurement of the price variable.
At the theoretical level, there seemsto be some consensusthat the
measure should reflect the price of the flow of servicesderived from
a given housing stock. However, since this is not directly measurable,
different measuresof price of housingservicesare applied in housing
demand studies. Some authorsusesome index representingconstruc-
tion cost (Lee, 1964; Muth, 1960). Others like de Leeuw (1971) and
Carliner (1973) use the averagecost of an arbitrarily specified dwel-
ling unit to measure price. Still some use appraisaland sale data to
derive estimatesof unit prices for housing(Muth, 1971 ; Polinsky and
Ellwood, 1979). More recent studies incorporate the estimation of
the price variable in a model basically derived from a production
function and the standard utility maximization problem (Follain
et al., 1980). The estimation procedure then involves calculating the
price variable for each household first and then substituting this cal-
culated price into the demand equation to estimate the price and
income elasticities.
Three measures of price are used in this study. The first is actual-
ly a proxy variable which reflects changes in price on account of
excess demand or supply shortage. The other two are more direct
measures of price each one used for the two sub-samples composed
of homeowners and renters. Average housing cost is used for the
farmer and the rental price index for the latter, all given at the
regional level.
Demographic Variables (Age and Marital status). Age is expected
to have a positive influence on demand. The variable should capture
the influence of the possible changesin the desirability of better and
more permanent forms of accommodation that come with age. Marital
status on the other hand is expected to capture partly the influence
of family size and the expected stronger desire for housing that
normally comes with marriage.
Shortage Variable. Measuredas a ratio of the difference between
the number of households and the number of housing/dwelling units
to the number of dwelling units in a particular region, this variable
hopes to reflect excessdemand or supply shortage. In effect, there-
fore, this variable should be able to catch variations in the price of
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housingdue to excessdemandand henceserveas proxy for the price
variable in the demand for housingequation.
The demand equation can be specifiedas follows:
(1) In R= _+/31 In FY+/32P+_ 3 IF/A +_ 4 MS+_S
where /31 = income elasticity of demand which is expected to be
greater than 0 and less than 1, and/32 = price elasticity, expected to
be lessthan 0 and 1 in absolute terms.
The use of FY corresponding to measured current income
presents theoretical problems so family monthly consumption expen-
ditures are also used to measure long-run income. Actual monthly
consumption expenditure is not given directly in the survey. How-
ever, monthly family saving figures are given and consumption
expenditure is derived as a residual from monthly family income and
monthly family savings.
Empirical Results
The estimates of the income and price elasticities are given by
the coefficients of the income and consumption ex.penditu'reand
price terms since these variablesare in logarithm form. The resultsof
the regressionsare given in Tables 3.2 to 3.5. As expected, income
elasticity is positive and lessthan one indicating a highly income
inelastic demand for housing. Initially, a price term is not included in
the analysis and this may possibly result in a downward bias in the
income elasticity estimate.1° This isverified when we look at the very
low income coefficients given in Table 3.2. The addition of more
variables, specifically the proxy variable for price, increasesthe
elasticity of income estimate from 0.02 to 0.14 (Table 3.2).
This result proves to be consistent with estimates obtained in
South Korea, although the values for the Philippines are slightly
lower.11
The elasticity estimate usingfamily consumption expenditure is
smaller than those obtained usingcurrent measuredincome although
they remain positive and highly significant. This result runs counter
to the general theoretical expectation that estimatesof income elas-
ticity using proxies for permanent income are largerthan those using
10. See Polinsky (1977).
11. The results for South Korea using current disposable income reveal an income
elasticity of about 0.18 - 0.16 (Follain etaL, 1980).
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TABLE 3.2
DependentVariable In R
Independent AII Homeowners Renters
Variable
i
Constant 174.5944 212.7567 85.9365
In FY 0.0222 0.0104 0.0381
(4.80) (1.87) (6.57)
_2 0.0183 0.0029 0.0816
F value 23.0358 3.5275 43.2190
N 1344 i
current income. In fact, studies in the U.S. and U.K. reveal that on
the average, the permanent income elasticity estimates are 50% high-
er than the currerfc income elasticity estimates (Polinsky, 1977). This
problem may be attributed to some measurement problems involving
income and consumption expenditure. It is possible that the income
TABLE 3.3
DependentVariable: In R
Independent Selection
Variables I 2
Constant 3.2283 4.0618
/n FY 0.1401 -
(6.83)
In FC - 0.0271
(3.71)
In A 0.2801 0.2793
(s.43) (5.32)
MS --0.0832 -0.0756
(--2.22) (-1.99)
S -0.9880 -0.3579
(-0.49) (-0.18)
_2 0.0623 0.0365
F value 16.7397 9.9600
N 1344
Note:t-valuesin parenthesisunderneatht eregressioncoefficients.
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figures given in the completed questionnaire are understated and
since consumption expenditure is derived as a residual using the
monthly family savings, then the variable may not reflect the true
consumption expenditure level. The use of this understated variable
may have caused a downward bias in the consumption expenditure
elasticity estimate, it is, however, not possible to verify this on
account of the nature of the survey which depended on mailed
answers.
Empirical studies, especially those done in the United States
suggest that the income elasticity for homeowners is higher than
those for renters (Reid, 1962;.Lee, 1968; de Leeuw, 1971). In fact,
in a survey of demand for housing studies in the United States, de
Leeuw (1971) suggests that the true income elasticity lies between
about 0.6 to 0.9 for renters and between about 0.7 and 1.7 for own-
ers. This result is further confirmed by the results obtained in the
analysis done by the type of occupancy, i.e., rentersand homeowners_
given in Table 3.4. The current income elasticity for homeowners is
0.26 as against 0.0"/for renters. A similar observation is made for the
consumption expenditure elasticity estimates.
TABLE 3.4
Homeowners Renters
/ndependent ....
Variables I 2 1 2
Constant 3.0278 4.5822 4.3918 4.8140
In FY 0.2634 - 0.0737 -
(8.09) (3.67)
In FC - 0.0529 - 0.0184
(4.33) (2.63)
In A -0.0197 -0.0092 0.1035 0.0992
(-0.23) (-0.10) (1.99) (1.89)
MS --0.0636 -0.0895 -0.0014 -0.0062
(-1.13) (-I..52) (-0.04) (-0.16)
S -0.7956 -0.9124 -0.34838 -0.0456
(-0.53) (-0.26) (-0.18) (-2.02)
_2 0.1674 0.0880 0.0179 0.0104
F value 20.1063 10.1631 4.1514 2.8240
N 868 476
i I
Note: t-values in parentheses underneath the regressioncoefficients.
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Using more direct measures of price allow us to get estimates of
the price elasticity of demand for both homeowners and renters.
However, while the estimate is negative and significant for renters,
the same is not true in the case of homeowners. The coefficient
is not significant, although it has the correct sign. It seems that
demand for housing in this particular market is also price inelastic.
The conclusion of the price term did not change the income elasti-
city estimate except in the case of homeowners where it slightly
improved to 0.28.
The other variables included in the demand equation seem to
behave according to expectations. Age has a positive and significant
influence on housing consumption while the shortage variable exerts
a negative effect. If this variable approximates the relative prices of
housing in the market, then the coefficients display the correct sign.
The coefficient of the marital status variable seems to render an
inconclusive influeoce on the demand. Perhaps a more direct measure
of household size should be used, when possible.
TABLE 3.5
DependentvariableIn R
Independent variables Homeowners Renters
Constant 3.550 3.0024
lu FY 0.2816 (8.57) 0.0735 (3.67)
lu P -0.0600 (-0.51) -0.2010 (-1.64)
lu A -0.1017 (-1.17) 0.1079 (0.05)
MS --0.0843 (-1.49) -0.0030 (-0.07)
_2 0.1354 0.0207
F value 19.6027 5.5902
N 868 476
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CHAPTER4
GOVERNMENTINTERVENTIONIN HOUSING:
A BACKGROUND
Introduction
The dominant role of government in financing, providing and
legally controlling housing isa phenomenon observabletoday in both
developed and developing economies. Almost always, governments
try to justify these incursions becauseof inherent imperfections in
the market. Housing as an economic good is said to possesscertain
characteristics which give rise to problems of optimal allocation.
Difficulties in the separation of consumption and investment ele-
ments and the substantial costs involved in housing may result
in distributional problems to such an extent that the market
mechanism fails and government intervention becomes necessary.
A historical sketch of housingpolicies in more developed nations
revealsthat public intervention dates back even before World War I.
Such intervention, however, was limited only to regulatory measures
to assureminimum standards of safety and health such as building
and occupancy codes.12
Improvement of housing conditions was left to the market or to
the employers (in the case of labor formally employed in private
enterprises) whose efforts were consideredvery erratic, hence,with-
out significant impact. This limited role of the government in
housing was a result of the general economic ideology espousing
that optimal resource allocation is achieved from the untramelled
interplay of economic market forces, which especially became
popular after the industrial revolution. This idea though comes
into conflict with social forces compelling government action in
housing, especially the poor housing condition of urban workers.
Such conflict and the resulting government actions demonstrated
that the profit motive in the housing market had failed to produce
the beneficial results expected to flow from unfettered compe-
tition.
12. See Burns and Grebler (1977) for a more detailed discussion,
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In the years that followed, government intervention had broad-
ened in scope to include measuresespecially designedto aid the
housingsector and to expand or/and upgradethe supplyof dwellings
to the poor. Thus, we observe a range of alternative policies intro-
duced in different countries at different points in time; mortgage
loans being provided or guaranteed by government_, state institu-
tions being established to finance investments shunned by private
capital due to the high risks involved, subsidiesassistingslum clear-
anceor rehabilitation and rehousingallowancesbeingpaid to families
who cannot afford to pay market rents.
The approach towards the housing problem taken by each
country and over time varied. For example, while the United States
tried to maintain a very active privatesector in its housingprograms,
most countries in Europe maintained the share of government
financing and public enterprise in total residentialconstruction at a
high level especially during the 1920s. In fact the Central govern-
ments provided the bulk of funds for loanswhich weregivenat sub-
market rates of interest or for subsidiesor both. The policy orien-
tation of the United States towards private enterprise was clearly
manifested in the preambleof the HousingAct of 1949 which empha-
sizes"the realization assoonas feasibleof the goal of a decent home
and a suitable living environment for every American family", and
that, "private enterpriseshouldbe encouragedto serveas largea part
of the total need as it can" with government assistanceto be "uti-
lized where feasible to enable private enterpriseto servemore of the
total need.''13 In contrast, the British HousingAct of 1949 stipulated
that "the Government's first objective is to afford a separatedwelling
for every family which desiresto haveone". TM
This contrast in policy orientation is highlighted here because
this gives usa spectrum of policiespotentially applicable in develop-
ing economies. At one extreme we observe an emphasis on house
construction as a strategic economic activity which can prime the
economy during periodsof economicslowdown especiallybecauseof
its "multiplier" effects. At the other extreme we havea more exclu-
sive concern with direct intervention to improve the housing con-
13. Taken from Burnsand Grebler(1977) which quotedfrom the US HousingAct of
1949, C. 330163 State.413. p. 80.
14. /bid, p. 80, as taken from A.L. Schorr,SlumsandSocialSecurity_WashingtonDC:
Department of Health, Educationand Welfare, SocialSecurity Administration, Research
Report No. 1, (1963) p. 177.
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dition of people who are believed to be disadvantaged by the market
mechanism.
The 1940s saw the start of substantial public intervention in
housing among the developing countries, Although observed to have
been patterned after the housing policies in Europe and the United
States these housing policies can be classified under two major cate-
gories, is
One policy is the adoption of programs developed in the ad-
vanced nations but adjusted to suit local conditions. For example,
governments are improving the financial structure supporting the
housing sector believing this to be the key to an efficient and success-
ful housing program. This isdone by creating and strengthening public
and private mortgage lending financial institutions, introducing
government guarantees on mortgage loans and establishing savings
and loan associations. In some countries, social housing programs are
pursued which are wholly or partially funded by the national govern-
ment. Still in some, development banks and social security institu-
tions become substantial financiers and sometimes owner-developers
of projects.
The other type of policy seems to be more realistically suited to
the economic and fiscal capacity of developing economies. This
orientation emanates from the realization that European and other
foreign models, for government funded and subsidized housing pose
severe constraints especially in terms of the limited resources avail-
able in low-income countries. Very few people also benefit from the
adopted models. Massive importation of building materials required
by such models results in a negative effect on the balance of pay-
ments position of the country. Thus, a set of policies was adopted
that would allow a larger portion of the population to benefit from
the housing program. This policy orientation was clearly evident in
the 1960s and one of the most commonly adopted approaches was
the "sites and services" approach. Under this scheme the government
provides the land, takes care of the layout of the site, secures land
tenure for the occupants and installs/provides facilities for water
supply and waste disposal and other basic community needs. The
building of the housing units is left to the residents. Variants of this
gradual approach are many and government support is substantial in
almost all these schemes.
15. Ibid, p. 88.
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Most housing policies even among advanced nations owe their
origins to some form of emergencies in the past like wars or econo-
mic depressions or inflations calling for rent control. Although
initially aimed to provide short-term effects, these policies have be-
come embedded in the structure. Subsequent policies then were
somehow grafted on to the existing ones in response to new prob-
lems or failure of the existing programs to solve old problems, or
still, failure to accommodate certain groups in its implementation.
Theoretical Argumentsfor Intervention
Why has housing received the kind and amount of government
intervention it did in the past among the developed economies and at
present even among the developing countries?
At the theoretical level, several authors come up with a number
of circumstances which warrant government intervention. Burns and
Grebler (1977) cite four (4) major criteria for public intervention in
the provision of a good or service. The question then becomeswhet-
her housing qualifies under any of these four standards:
1. Merit Goods. If the good or service is obviously in the public
interest or extremely expensive but whose costs are impossible to
allocate to specific beneficiaries then it is generally provided by the
government. The list of merit goods varies among countries but
housing (especially for low-income groups) is more or less seen as a
merit good or akin to merit good by countries like United Kingdom,
Canada and the Netherlands) 6
2. Goods Distributed Unequally. When goods and services are
distributed in a way contrary to set social objectives, government
intervention is always looked upon as a corrective mechanism.
Housing is considered as one of the means which can be used
by the government in reallocating wealth in order to distribute
consumption more equitably.
3. Large Projects and Economies of Scale. Under this criterion,
public intervention in housing may be justified for two important
activities, namely, land assembly for Iarge-scale, comprehensive re-
development programs and experiments involving building techno-
16. This is ba._d on the share of total residential construction directly supported by the
national treasury of each country,
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Iogy and other types of housing projects considered risky which
normally may not attract private (sector) investment.
4. Market Imperfections. This involves the organization and
structure of the housing and mortgage markets which almost always
deny the poor of accessto financing.
Stafford (1977) likewise enumerates more specific circumstances
under which government intervention in housing may take place.
These include natural monopoly, the existence of externalities, con-
sumer rationality, uncertainty, income distribution and imperfect
capital markets.
The first case is easily used in the provision of education and
health services but proves difficult in the case of housing, especially
in the Philippines where the desire for homeownership among house-
holds is overwhelmingly strong. The existence of externalities which
may come in the form of blight and decay (as a result of undercon-
sumption of housing services) is a very popular argument for inter-
vention especially in the United States. Grigsby (1963) argues that
"the private market works only to erect, alter and discard assetsand
seems incapable of providing replacement houses on the same site
and in no way foster renewal". The normative judgement that the
individual is the best judge of his own welfare and the assumption
that individual preferences are revealed by choices are challenged by
arguments put forward that individuals are unable to make the right
decisions if left to themselves. Hence, the government should inter-
vene to ensure that individuals consume a different and better
quality and quantity package of housing services than they would
consume otherwise if left to themselves. Another argument for
government intervention is the fact that individuals may not be able
to make the right decisions on account of inadequate or imperfect
knowledge about the market. Finally, income inequalities and the
organization of housing and mortgage markets may prevent poor
families from obtaining the "standard" housing package. The poor
inevitably find themselves in trouble paying the rent for a given
rented unit or securing finance for house purchase.
Wheaton (1981) also discussessome of the underlying arguments
advanced in favor of government intervention in housing through
policies of regulation and control, and subsidies in Egypt. The first
of these arguments rests on the issue of income redistribution. It is
held that direct income redistribution is administratively difficult
especially in developing economies, so a country's social equity goals
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are best achieved through a subsidy program involving commodities
or serviceswhoseconsumption is income inelastic.
The second argument suggests that temporary controls on
housing prices are necessarywhen changesin pricesare due to short-
run bottlenecks. This is basedon the belief that price increasesonly
create windfall gains and will not necessarilyresult in higher supply
sincesupply is fairly inelastic in the short run. The soundnessof this
argument dependsof course on whether the price changesare really
just temporary in nature; they may be causedby structural factors
which may make them more permanent instead.
The final argument is perhaps the most popular and it suggests
that there are social benefits from housingbeyond those accruing to
the occupants, that housing should be consumed and produced at
levelsgreater than what is ordinarily suppliedby the private market.
The hypotheseswhich emerged suggestthat improved housing:
1) improves labor productivity through better motivation and
health;
2) improves health conditions; and
3) improves the public visualor aestheticenvironment.
A review of some of the studies undertaken to test the first two
of these hypotheses reveals that there is no conclusive evidence
showing that these social benefits do indeed result from better
housing.
Different countries have implemented different policy thrusts
over time and there seems to be no convincing evidence that one
type of orientation is superior over the others. The only clear
messageis that government intervention is justified not only on the
grounds that it can prove that the market breaks Clownin the provi-
sion of housing, but that it can do better and really does better than
the market.
Past experiences of developed economies reveal that although
they have separately pursued housing strategies through different
sets of policy instruments, these strategies have in many ways
remained similar to one another in the context of what they want to
achieve. Specifically, they have been constructed along four major
elements which are not really mutually exclusive:
1. The encouragementof owner-occupation;
2. The provision of public owned rented accommodation allo-
cated by "need";
3. The protection of private tenants through rent control and
security of tenure legislation;
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4. The improvement of housingstocksthrough
(a) conservationand renovation
(b) urban renewal
(c) filtering 17
(d) income supplement.
Experiencesof SelectedCountries
It is very common to find program strategiesadopted in develop-
ing countries which are very similar, if not entire replications, of
strategies earlier introduced in the more developed economies.
Housing policies have not been spared of this "tradition '). It is ins-
tructive, therefore, to review the experiences of selected countries
in terms of their housingprograms.
Starting off with the more developed economies, the United
States, United Kingdom and Sweden stand out specifically because
they represent three different major approaches to the housing
problem. In more general terms, Swedenadopted a socialist market
in housingwhere there is very little role for private capital and where
government intervention was regarded not merely as a temporary
necessitybut a more permanent involvement which was both politi-
cally and economically advantageous. The British policy on the
other hand went through different stageson account of relatively
rapid changesin the leadership(i.e., alternation in the Office of Con-
servative and Labour Governments). Basically, though, a welfare
approach to housingwas taken by the government. Local authorities
were encouraged to build council houses for the working-class
people a_qdrent subsidiesto tenants were abundant. Rent control
was also introduced and remained in effect for some time. Finally,
the United States housingpolicy in a sense"is to have no policy
and rely on private enterprise," (Heacley, 1978, p. 175). Private
enterprise, however, has been stimulated by increased demand for
owner-occupied housing resulting from tax concessionsand mort-
gage guarantees which the federal government makes available to
home-owners. Unlike Sweden and the United Kingdom, the lower
income groups in the United States are said to have received less
attention with Congressintroducing more or lessuncoordinated and
17. Filt0ring in the literature is defined in terms of changes in the real values of an exist-
ing unit of housing stock. According to Lowry (1960), a dwelling unit has filtered if, and
only if) the quality of housing stock contained in the unit has changed. Hence, a dwelling
unit has filtered up (down) if) and only if, the quantity of housing stock (or housing services
yielded per time period) contained in this unit has increased (decreased).
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diverse programs (e.g. public housing and subsidized rental and mort-
gage interest programs), largely favoring the middle income group.
In the Latin American countries, specifically Mexico and Brazil,
governments also concentrated their efforts on the provision of ade-
quate housingservicesto the poor. In Mexico, for example, a Nation-
al Housing Fund was established in 1972 which in essencetook over
the responsibility of providing housing to the working class from
private establishments (firms with 100 employees or more were re-
quired by law to provide housingfacilities to its workers).
All enterprises were obliged to give bi-monthly contribution to
the Fund equivalent to 5% of the basesalary of each worker. This,
plus the addition of considerable money from the government has
created the financial capability to construct low-cost housing in
volume (i.e., 70,000 units during the first 3 years) to be distributed
to the workers on the basisof a lottery system which discriminates
lessagainst employees of small enterprises or those who changetheir
place of work. The government also fixed certain minimum standards
of construction and urban development in areas where the Fund
operates on a large scale. The recipients pay the NHF monthly
installments which may be spread over twenty years at an interest
rate of not more than 4%. But similar to what happened in the devel-
oped economies before, the program reachedonly a few of the target
population. De Alcantara (1977) observes that while the program
provided institutional assistancein obtaining private dwellingsfor the
lower income groups, they were still seen as a privileged group since
the cost of housing was roughly fifteen times more than the cost of
rural housing.
Similarly in Brazil, the National Housing Bank was created in
1964 to promote overall development through the direct and indirect
effects of housing projects upon the housing-relatedindustries, and
to encourage family savings.Resourcesfrom the Funds de Garantia
por Tempo de Servico (an all-inclusive social security fund) were
used for this purpose but not really as a means to provide low-cost
housing(Singer, P. and B. Lamounier, 1977).
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CHAPTER 5
PUBLIC POLICY AND THE PHILIPPINE HOUSING MARKET
The brutal fact of the matter is that for all this weightof law and money,
no governmentin my view haseverhada consistenthousingpolicy, andwe
still in 1975 haveserious,indeedoften desperate,residualhousingproblems
- particularlyfor the worst off in our Society. We haveovercrowding.We
havehomelessness.We have familiesliving in squalidconditions.We havea
systemof subsidieswhich distributeaid to housingin a whimsicalmanner
and we have lurchesin total investmentin housingwhich amongstother
things, have seriously damaged the efficiency of our building industry
Croslandl 1975). lg
These statements describe the state of government intervention
in the housing market in the United Kingdom. The problem that
these statements present is all too familiar in a developing country
like the Philippines. As early as the decade of the 30s, several legis-
lations had been passed creating new bodies or replacing old ones to
take care of the housing problem. Different thrusts emanated and
since most of these agencies were short-lived, the impact of the prog-
rams introduced were mostly superficial.
Government intervention in the Philippine housing market today
is so pervasive not only in terms of the number of agencies created
but more importantly in terms of expenditure that some sectors of
society have started to question whether such an active and direct
role is indeed necessary and beneficial considering the country's
current economic problems. More detailed questions like who really
benefit from public expenditures for housing or whether the govern-
ment should subsidize new construction and rehabilitation are also
posed. While political considerations will always influence answers to
these policy questions, a more systematic evaluation of some of the
18. Taken from Stafford (1978). These were the words of the late Mr. Anthony Cros-
land, the Secretary of State for Environment at the United Kingdom, when he indicted post-
war governments for the preponderance of piecemeal legislations and the lack of a sustained
and cohesive policy in spite of the enormous increases in public investment on housing.
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existing programs and their alternatives should provide a better
perspective for policymakers thereby reducing their dependence on
plain undocumented rhetoric when drawing up housing programs.
This part of the study hopesto accomplishthis end.
A Brief Historical Background19
Prewar housing conditions must have already warranted some
form of government intervention. As early as the American regime,
some efforts to developa housingpolicy wereevident although these
were concentrated in Manila on account of itsovercrowding and sani-
tation problems. Hence, the initial steps taken under the American
regime were in the form of a sanitation drive. This was carried out
by setting new sanitation and buildingstandards that were adopted to
native dwelling construction and establishment of "sanitary barrios"
which servedasrelocation areasfor families whose nipa housesorigin-
ally located in congested areas were demolished. These barrios were
located within city boundaries and were supplied with basicfacilities
not available in the nipa neighborhoods, (e.g., surface drainage,
streets and alleys, fire hydrants, public bath and public laundry).
Relocation was made at public expense but the relocated families
had to pay some amount for rent to the landowners (Ocampo,
1976).
After about two years of implementation, funds for this project
dwindled and sites became more difficult to acquire, This was also
accompanied by a change in the.housing program's thrust to sanitary
models of single-family and apartment units. However, according to
Ocampo (1976), "these model houses were built for demonstration
purposes only since the government did not actually supply new
houses in the sanitary barrios" (p. 3).
By the 1920s as a result of labor agitation, barrios obrerox were
established and this scheme was merely superimposed on the
previous sanitary barrio scheme with some additional features like
the renting out of some houses and lots.
Evidently, the government under the American regime carried
out housing programs just as a matter of maintaining public health
19. This part of the study draws extensively from a study of housing conducted by
NEDA in 1981, particularly the article on Trends in Housing Delivery by Sonya Ligot. A
similar discussion also appeared in a series of articles written by Commissioner Ernesto C,
Mendiola, Chief Executive Officer of the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission which
appeared in Bulletin Today (1983). The articles of Ocampo (1976, 1978) also provided the
baseline information especially during the prewar and early postwar periods.
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and safety and avoiding the proliferation of breeding grounds for
crime and sedition. Hence, the programs basically involved slum
clearance and some relocation. With the influence of the private
sector, however, the evolving housing policy of the regime was
"something less than pure altruism for the poor" (Ocampo 1976, p.
8). For example, the Housing Committee recommended the cons-
truction of dwellings for slum families who could afford them and
this was in spite of the fact that during the period (circa early 1930s)
about 60%of the slum families could not afford 'any kind of suitable
home,' and 40% of slum-dwellers in Manila "live in extreme poverty
and squalor, in many instances on the verge of starvation," (Ocampo,
1976 as quoted from another source, p. 8).
During the Commonwealth period, a program of social justice
emerged and while the period's housing policy tried to respond to
the needs of the labor group, it remained in part just an extension of
the previous period's program. Hence, the slums were still seenas the
source of crime and diseases as well as the breeding place of rebels.
Officials of the Commonwealth government also felt that slums were
an eyesore and there were efforts to make the city presentable to the
eyes of the foreigners.
More direct government intervention evidently started in the
1930s. In 1938, the laborer's tenement project was completed in
Barrio Vitas, Tondo. Eleven two-storey buildings were constructed
and these provided 262 dwelling units with modern toilets, water
supply and electrical installations. Rents were low (i.e., rates ranged
between _4.70 and _12.70 per month) and the required monthly
income was between _30 and _'100. However, the project's name
was somewhat a misnomer since a good proportion of the tenants
(i.e., 37%) were classified as employees (and not laborers). This
resulted because applicants without stable job were not considered.
This project was followed by a series of broader legislations and
the creation of housing agencies to directly implement housing
programs. On July 11, 1936, Commonwealth Act. No. 620 or the
Homesite Act was passed which authorized the government to
acquire lay as well as friar states which were eventually subdivided
into home lots or small farms. One major acquisition made in 1938
was the Diliman site which was intended to be a "social experiment"
to be replicated in all parts of the country where there are laborers.2°
20. Apparently, this was an ambitious project as evidenced in the words of President
Manuel L. Quezon as quoted by Ocampo (1976), p. 17.
"It will not be long now when the shore which we now see will be filled and
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The people's Homesite Corporation was created to develop this
area.21 Its charter, however,evidently did not reflect the bias towards
the working-classascribed to the Diliman projectat the start of its
implementation, and although it was aimed at general welfare, it
actually reflected an orientation towards the middle class.
In early 1941, a shift towards a more social orientation in the
government's housing program was observed. Policy was geared
towards social responsibility which required state intervention and
assistancein behalf of the poor particularly the wageearners residing
in the slums. The National Housing Commission was created by
virtue of Commonwealth Act 648 to undertake programs in urban
housing, subdivision and slum clearance programs. Its objectives were
basically urban-oriented but while they emphasized the elimination
of slums, they also considered replacement of slum dwellings. Also
instead of being "middle class", these objectives were aimed broadly
at the needy and the very poor. The organization of the NHC was
not carried out immediately on account of the war.
Early postwar housing programs retained the previous
period's thrust: slum clearance, subdivision development and reloca-
tion activities as authorized under the PHC and the NHC charters.
In 194"/, the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC)
wascreated through Executive Order No. 93. This new agencywasthe
result of the merging of the People's Homesite Corporation and the
National Housing Commission and it had the following corporate
objectives:
(1) establishment of public housing for low-income families;
(2) slum clearance;
(3) establishmentof housingfor destitutes;and
(4) acq'uisition,subdivisionand resaleof landedestates.
Again the agency's program focused on housingand subdivision
development catering basically to the needs of the middle-income
groups. Its slum clearanceand relocation functions were carried out
only in collaboration with other agenciesof government, specifically
those involved in socialwelfare servicesdelivery.
become dry land where laborer's housescan be built... Likewise, the Government will
construct a townsite adjacent to the city, sufficient to accommodate 21,000 families,
enabling them to build houses on 200*square meter lots, This new townslt¢ will have a
hospital, a beautiful and clean market, wide roads,.., a nursery where nurses will take
care of babieswhile their mothers work in factories and industrial houses,playgrounds,
... a big park... Laborers, who now llve in crowded places located In low and muddy
regions In the city will have the comforts which they do not enjoy at present."
21. For a detailed description of the work done by the PHC, seeO©ampo (1976), p. 18.
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PHHC was envisioned to operate more like a private enterprise
guided by a set of objectives to arrive at, as a result of combining
PHHC and NHC's objectives. PHHC's performance until the 1960s
cannot be presented here in detail but a discussionof its specific
projectscan be obtained from Ocampo (1978).
Like any government corporation during the period, financial
as well as institutional problems plagued PHHC's operations. Con-
ceptually, it was there to "operate not for profit but for service."
However, it was also expected to be self-sustaining.In one of its
reports, PHHC clearly presented the issue:
In its true concept,public housingshouldservefamilieswhocannotafford
decent dwellings,and therefore should chargelower rents than private
housing. Most countriesaccomplishthis by subsidizingpublic housing.
Unfortunately,however,public housingin the Philippines... is financed
and treated like privatehousingand consequentlymust operatelike one.
(Ocampo,1978, p. 12 asquoted from PHHC,Annual Report,1958-1959,
p. 11).
Critics of the operations of PHHC were numerous. The program
area hard hit was its land acquisition program which, according to
some critics, entailed very exorbitant costs. This resulted in resale
prices which were considered too high for employees to pay. Also,
because of its dual function as a producer of housing for low income
families and as a private enterprise, PHHC encountered a high in-
ventory of land which it could not develop anymore.
The succeeding decade saw new problems emerging as a result
of the increasing need to house more people and the corresponding
lack of mortgage funds. Thus the Home Financing Commission was
created through Republic Act 580 on September 15, 1950 and its
main thrust was the mortgage insurance program. 22 This program en-
couraged banks and financial institutions to grant housing loans on
easy terms of payment. It also helped in the mobilization of inves-
tible funds of financing entities for housing purposes through the
reduction of risks on loans with longer periods of maturity. In1978,
this Commission took on another name, Home Financing Corpora-
tion, and operated under the umbrella of the Ministry of Human
Settlements.
22. This function has been assigned by law to PHHC in 1948, but this agency never
performed it. The HFC which was created with the help of foreign advisers (mostly Ameri-
cans), was patterned after the US Federal Housing administration and commenced its ope-
rations only in 1956.
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It was also during this decade that the social security agency for
government employees or the Government Service insurance System
(GSIS) started to extend inter-agency project loans to finance PHHC
projects.23 By 1955, it started granting housing loans to its own mem-
bers. Two years later, the Social Security System also began to
extend housing loans to its members. The Development Bank of the
Philippines also started a small-loans program for low income
borrowers in 1960. 24Similar to the housing programs launched earlier,
a very small proportion of the low-income group availed of the loans
from these institutions since the rules governing the program favored
only the middle income groups and even the upper classes(Quifiones,
1974).
During the 1960s, the directions of the government's housing
program were as follows:
I. expansion of housing finance scheme by geographical cover-
age;
2. tenement housing;
3. construction of pre-fabricated dwelling units; and
4. increasing resettlement and relocation programs cure indus-
trial development.
The Tenement Law (R.A. 3469) was passed reviving the construction
of multi-storey tenement houses which were rented out to low
income families. It was also during this period that Congress passed
R.A. 3802 mandating PHHC to sell all its rented housing units to the
tenants at cost and payable within 10 years at 6% per annum interest
and with all the previous rental payments applied to the purchase
price. Likewise, several resettlement and relocation activities of squat-
ters were undertaken. The National Housing Corporation was created
with the primary function of manufacturing pre-fabricated dwelling
units for low and middle income groups to help in the coordinated
massive housing program of the government. The National Special
Housing Act (R.A. 6026) was also passed to introduce a new ap-
proach to the resettlement program of the government through a
balanced residential-industrial development program. Under this
approach, resettled squatters were given necessary and appropriate
means of livelihood so they would not abandon the resettlement
areas.
The low income families remained the target group of govern-
ment administered housing projects in the 1970s. Urban redevelop-
23. GSIS was ¢r0ated in 1936 by virtue of Commonwealth Act No, 186.
24. DI]P was formerly the Philippine Rehabilitation Finance Corportion (RFC).
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ment through the sites and services approach became the primary
focus of the government, specifically the Tondo Foreshore and
Dagat-dagatan Area. Government lending institutions provided subs-
tantial con*_ribution through individual residential loans and parti-
cipation in mass housing projects. This decade also witnessed the
creation of a number of new government agenciesto take care of the
housing program of the government:
1. Task Force on Human Settlements (1973)
2. Inter-Agency Task Force on Nabaooan Relocation (1973)
3. Tondo Foreshore Development Authority (1974)
4. National Housing Authority (1975)
5. Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (1976)
6. National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (1979)
7. Ministry of Human Settlements (1978)
8. Home Development Mutual Fund (1978)
It can be gleaned from the above discussion that the concept
of housing in the Philippines had undergone remarkable changes
over the years. Initially considered simply as a "public problem"
involving slum dwellers and squatters (i.e., the low income groups),
housing has evolved into a program considered in the context of a
"human settlements approach" where the provision of shelter is
complemented by the other dimensions of human settlements. Self-
reliance is emphasized so the program really becomes a "partnership"
between the government and the beneficiaries.
Until the last few years of the 1970s, the proliferation of govern-
ment housing bodies evidently resulted in many duplications and
confusion. There was little coordination among these agencies that
a more cohesive and sustained housing program was never accomp-
lished. Piecemeal legislations were abundant and each one wasserving
only a particular purpose and a particular group for a limited period
of time. This resulted in very superficial and short-lived effects and
on the whole a waste of scarce resources.
In an attempt to deliver more housing services to a greater
number of people and to consolidate the efforts of the different
housing agencies, the National Shelter Program was formulated in
1978 putting all housing agencies of the government under one
Ministry responsibility. It was during this year that the Ministry of
Human Settlements was established for this very purpose. Under this
program, maximum participation of the private sector was en-
couraged.
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The National Shelter Program
The National Shelter Program integrates the four basiccompo-
nents of a housing program, namely: regulation, production, finance
and marketing. The rationalization, efficient operation and comple-
mentation of these basic components bring together sevenagencies
and corporations which operate under the umbrella of the Ministry
of Human Settlements.Theseagenciesinclude the following:
1. National Housing Authority (NHA)
2. The National HousingCorporation (NHC)
3. The Human Settlements Development Corporation (HSDC)
4. The Human Settlements Regulatory Commission(HSRC)
5. The Home Financing Corporation (HFC)
6. The National Home Mortgage Finance Corp. (NHMFC)
7. The Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)
Operating in the context of the four program components, the
Ministry of Human Settlements, through one or a combination of
the above-citedagencies,performsa big bundle of functions, to wit:
1. Regu/ation. Generally, this involves a continuous rationali-
zation of building standards and regulations governing housing
construction and subdivision development (i.e., implementation of
PD 957 and Batas Pambansa Bldg. 220). Specifically, the function
involves regulation of buying and selling activities that take place in
the context of land development. Carried out specifically by the
Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC), the objective
is to protect prospective buyers of housing units from unscrupulous
developersand sellers.
2. Production. The functions related to production are basically
geared towards ensuring a continuous supply of housing construction
inputs ranging from technical expertise to construction materials
which use indigenous and inexpensive materials. These functions
are:2s
a. Standardization of housingcomponents and actual pre-fabri-
cation;
b. Stockpiling of critical material components through ad-
vancedvolume purchases;
c. Accreditation and franchising of private developers, cons-
tructors, fabricators, and suppliers who shall directly participate in
the actual constructionof identified housingprojects.
25. Muld-y¢ar Human Settlements Plan, 1983.
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3. Marheting. The marketing function is being undertaken
through the following programs:
a. "Buyer-builder-bank". This is a schemewhere a developer is
allowed to pre-market the houseand lot packageswhile construction
is still on-going. The buyer then invests definite amounts for his
choice of house and lot and the hank servesas the depository of the
buyer's investment.
b. Home matching. This is an on-line referral system which
matches prospective home buyers against current inventory and
maintains files of Pag-ibigmembers who intend to avail of housing
loansat any future date.
4. Finance. Viewed by many as the most crucial component
of the shelterprogram, the shelterfinance systemoperatesalongtwo
major schemes, namely: development financing and homebuyers or
end-user financing. The operation of the system basically involves
three major government housing bodies, namely: the Home Finan-
cing Corporation, the National Home MortgageFinanceCorporation
and the Home Development Mutual Fund or Pag-IBIG.
A schematic diagram of how the National Shelter Program
operatesis givenin Figure 5.1.
The National Shelter Program envisions to deliver 1,000,000
homes within a period of 10 years, or an equivalentof 100,000 units
per year for 10 years. In Metro Manila alone, 200,000 housesare
expected to be constructedduring the period 1983-1987. The rest of
the regionsare expected to get the following allocationsfor the same
period36
These housing targets of course require commitments for con-
struction materials from the National Housing Corporation, and a
total value of f'21.78 billion worth of construction materialsis esti-
mated for the samefive-year period.
In terms of end-user financing, the NHMFC places the finance
requirement for the five-year period of_35 billion. Finally, an aggre-
gate of about 5,200 hectaresof land are expected to be developedto
complete the program until 1987.
The successof this program hingessubstantially on the cooper-
ation of the private sector in all its components.Severalschemesare
being adopted by the MHS to involve the private sectorespeciallyin
land developmentand actual houseconstructionactivities. Likewise,
26. /bid,, p.23.
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•FIGURE 5.1a
J, ,[, ' J,
MateriaJs Developmental Construction Bulk Extension of Trading of Saving
Standardization Finance of Houses Purchase Incentives thru Mortgages Program
• Provam benefits
1 'U_ Rationalization _L"l,h of Subdivision and
Building Standard HSDC -- NHA -- NHC
_.] Private Sector(Banks, IH_-'- '. NHMFC _ 1ILandownel_, Developers, HDMFManufacturers)
• MARKET r((
1,000,000 Homes at Afford'able Price
aTaken from the Multi-Year Human Settlements Plan, 1983, p. 21.
TABLE 5.1
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF PROPOSEDHOME CONSTRUCTION
UNDER THE NSP, 1983-1987
No. of Points
Region I 23,615
II 18,765
III 40,165
IV 46,370
V 22,675
VI 22,385
VII 21,260
Vlll 16,520
IX 17,500
X 17,085
Xl 35,400
X II 18,260
TOTA L: 299,920
Source: Multi-Year Human Settlements Plan, 1983.
more private banks are being encouraged to participate in the home-
buyer's financing schemes. It is therefore instructive to discuss in
detail the shelter finance system since the availability of mortgage
funds seems to be the major constraint in buying or building a house,
especially among middle and low income families.
The Shelter Finance System
Two major components of the Shelter Finance System need more
elaboration since they play very crucial roles in the delivery of
housing units. These are the home-buyers' finance and the con-
struction and development finance. On one side is the program to
initiate more demand and on the other side is a program to induce a
higher supply of housing units. Playing key roles in this system are
the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF), the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) and the Home Financing
Corporation (H FC).
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Homebuyers' Finance
1. Home Development Mutual Fund (HDM F)
The HDMF, popularly known as Pag-IBIG_7 Fund isa provident/
savingssystem for private and government employeesand the self-
employed. Membership in the Fund entitles one to avail of the Pag-
IBIG housingloans.
All members contribute to the Fund an amount equivalent to
3% of their basic monthly salary which are equally counterparted
by their employers.2g The contributions are credited to the
employees account which earns annual dividends of no less than
7.5%._ In the caseof the self-employedand self-payingmembers,3°
the required contributions vary. Self-paying members contribute
6% of their Fund salarywhile the self-employedmemberscontribute
a fraction of their Fund salariesfollowing a schedule prepared by
Pag-IBIG. Unlessa member takes out a housingloan, total contribu-
tions plus dividendswill be returned to the member upon retirement,
disability, permanent departure from the country, or after 20 years
of membershipor death whichevercomesfirst.
The Pag-IBIG Fund entitles a member to borrow a housingloan
equivalent to thirty-six (36) times his Fund salary,but not to exceed
1=100,000.00.31 A couple and a third member of the family within
the fourth degree of consanguinity and who are members of the
Fund may join their loan capabilities for a combined loan not to
exceed f'300,000.O0. The loans carry a 9% interest rate per annum
and a maximum payment term of 25 years.
The Pag-IBIG loans are given to finance any of the following ac-
tivities:
1. Construction of a houseon a lot owned by the member;
27. Pag-IBIG is an acronym for Pagtutulungan: Industriya, Bangko, Ikaw, at Gobyerno.
28. In 1982, the amount of contribution was set at 2% of the basic monthly salary of
each member, again equally counterparted by the employer.
29. Variable dividends may also be declared depending on the earnings of the Fund. In
1981 and 1982, the Fund declared 2.5% additional dividends.
30. A person who is either an employee of a foreign embassy, military base, Internation-
al organization or institution with offices in the Philippines,an employee recruited in the
Philippines for employment abroad, or a non-permanent government employee not covered
by GSIS may become a self-paying member.
31. Regular members may avail of the loan after at least 6 months of continuous contri-
bution while self-paying and self-employed members will have to wait until after 12 months
of continuous contribution or he may, after 6 months of continuous contribution, opt to
advance the corresponding contributions for the next six months to hasten the availment of
the loan. Members under the Book 1 Classification can already borrow a housing loan equi-
valent to 48 times their Fund salaries.
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2. Construction of a house on a lot not yet owned or fully paid
for by the member;
3. Acquisition of a house-and-lot package;
4. Acquisition of a lot;
5. Acquisition of a residential unit in a condominium, town-
house, rowhouse, cluster or duplex;
6. Acquisition of an apartment unit; 32
7. Long-term leaseof a BLISS unit; :
8. Group Housing;
9. Home Improvement; and
10. Other special caseswhich the Board of Trustees may author-
ize.
A Pag-IBIG Fund member avails himself of a housing loan
through an accredited private or government lending institution
which processesand underwritesthe loan basedon established guide-
lines.33
As of the end of 1983, a total of 2.1 million members from
83,500 employers have been recorded. This membership base
includes those from the privat e and public sectors.
Table 5.2 below gives the income profile of the Fund's members
as of September 1982. It can be gleaned from the table that a big
proportion of the members, i.e., 82.43%, have monthly incomes of
_1,000 and lower. In fact, more than 50% of the total membership
reported monthly income of_550.00 and less. These figures become
even more significant if we consider the schedule of monthly amorti-
zation for specific amounts of loans which an individual member can
borrow.
The term of a Pag-IBIG loan, scheduled against the monthly
amortization due per_l .000.00 loan is as follows:
Repayment Period Monthly Amortization
25 years 8.39 per _1,000 loan
20 years 9.99 per f'1,000 loan
32. Introduced sometime In November, this program allows tenants to purchase the
apartment units they are presently occupying through a loan, the amount of which is deter-
mined on the basis of the floor area of the unit. The standard used for the computation of
the loan value is f=l,500/sq.m, or t*l,000/sq.m, and _500/sq.m. for improvement. The
program wasgood only until June 1984.
33. As of the end of 1983, there were 96 accredited lending institutions, four (4) of
which are government banks. The other institutions are classified as follows: private com-
mercial banks - 18; private development banks - 24; Savings and loan associations - 36;
building and loan association - 1; Insurance Companies -3; Finance Companies - 1; In-
vestment Houses - 2; and savingsand mortgage banks -- 7. Details are given in Annex A.
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TABLE 5.2
MEMBERSHIP PROFILE BY INCOME LEVEL
(AS OF SEPTEMBER1982)
Absolute CumulativeIncome Level Percent
Frequency Percent
Lowest - 250 24,981 6.68 6.68
251 - 400 56,898 15.21 21.89
401 - 550 124,348 33.24 55.13
551 - 700 54,674 14.62 69.75
701 - 850 29,557 7.90 77.65
851 - 1,000 17,885 4.78 82.43
1,000 - 1,150 11,618 3.11 85.54
1,151 - 1,300 6,098 1.63 87.17
1,301 - 1,450 4,242 1.13 88.30
1,451 - 1,600 3,587 0.96 89.26
1,601 - 1,750 2,386 0.64 89.90
1,751 - 1,900 1,927 0.52 90.42
1,901 - 2,050 2,536 0.68 91.10
2,051 - 2,200 2,525 0.68 91.78
2,201 - 2,350 1,211 0.32 92.10
2,351 - 2,500 1,027 0.27 92.37
2,501 - 2,650 760 0.20 92.57
2,651 - 2,800 1,200 0.32 92.89
2,801 - 2,950 544 0.15 93.04
2,951 and above 7,646 2.04 95.08
missing 18,404 4.92 100.00
TOTAL 374,054
Source:HomeDevelopmentMutualFund.
15 years 10.14 per _1,000 loan
10 years 12.67 per _1,000 loan
5 years 20.76 per fq ,000 loan
On at)50,000 loan for example, a borrower has to pay a monthly
amortization of _419.50 for 25 years. Following the standard pro-
portion of housing expense to total income of 25%, only families
receiving a monthly income of @1,678 or higher can afford to bor-
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row @50,000.34 This means, further, that only about I 0% of the total
membership of the Fund can borrow @50,000 as of ] 982. This result
is even more disappointing considering that a @50,000 loan can
hardly meet the current cost of acquiring a house and lot especially
in Metro Manila today.
if we consider the proportion of total household expenditure
which goes to housing as of ]979, this standard proportion of 25%
is more than 50% of the actual figure which comes to only 10.13%.
If we were to use this figure, which really makes sensesince a very
substantial portion of family income today is suspected to go to
more basic needs like food, then the situation is even worse. For the
same _'50,000 mortgage loan, only families with a monthly income
of about _4,141 and higher can afford to borrow. This means that
as of 1983, about 98.22 of the members are out of the market.
Using family income as the basis, only about 5.35% of the members
are able to borrow.
A recent survey of 3,457 Pag-IBIG members conducted by the
HDMF reveals that the average basic monthly income of the respon-
dents as of the second quarter of 1983 was @I,054.68. However,
52.7% still earn between @500 and @I,000 a month, while 13.9%
earn lessthan P500 (Table 5_3).
Compared with the 1982 profile, 66.58% is already an improve-
ment since a high 82.43% of total membership were receiving _I,000
or lessa month in 1982. Similarly, the averagemonthly basic income
obtained in a similar survey conducted a year earlier was _703.62
a month which is lower than that obtained in 1983 and 80.7% of the
respondents were still receiving below _1,000.
Considering family income instead makes the picture look better
(Table 5.4). A small 18.05% of the total respondents had monthly
incomes of@l,000 or lower. More than 50% (i.e., 53.72) of the res-
pondents had incomes of @3,000 and lower. An average monthly
income of@] ,800.96 was obtained and this compares fairly well with
the average of the previous year's survey which wasonly @1,028.00.
Worth considering , however, is the fact that only about ] 7.68% of
the total respondents reported family incomes which are higher than
34. Following the proscribed Ioanable amount equivalent to 48 times a member's fund
salary, a member who earns @1,678 can actually borrow as much asT_80,000. A graduated_
amortization plan has been introduced in early 1983 but its applicability is limited only to
members employed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the Integrated National
Police (INP), the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), the Ministry of Education,
Culture and Sports (MECS) and its attached agencies, including state schools, colleges and
universities.
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TABLE 53
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF BASIC MONTHLY SALARY
(N = 3457)
BasicMonthly Absolute Percent Cumulative
Salary Frequency Percent
Lessthan 500 480 13.88 13.88
501 - 1,000 1,822 52.70 6658
1,001 - 1,500 539 15.59 82.17
1,501- 2,000 194 5.61 87.78
2,001 - 2,500 70 2.02 89.80
2,501 - 3,000 47 1.36 9.16
3,001 - 3,500 12 0.35 91.51
3,501 - 4,000 17 0.49 92.00
4,001 - 4,500 9 0.26 92.26
4,501 - 5,000 6 0.17 92.43
5,001- 5,500 4 0.I2 92.64
5,501 - 6,000 3 0.09 62.67
6,001 - 6,500 1 0.03 92.67
6,501 - 7,000 7 0.20 92.87
7,001 - 7,500 1 0.03 92.90
7,501 - 8,000 4 0.12 93.02
8,001 - 8,500 2 0.06 93.08
8,501--9,000 0 0.00 93.08
9,001--9,500 0 0.00 93.08
9,501- 10,000 24 0.69 93.77
over10,000 9 0.26 94.03
no response 206 5.96 100.00
Averagebasicmonthlysalary:9"1,054.68
Source:CorporatePlanningDepartment,HDMFPagdBIGMembershipProfile and Fund
AwareneuSurvey,1983.
f3,000. This profile still suggests that a good proportion of the
membership of the Fund belongs to the low and middle income
families, considering that a monthly income oft_3,000 amounts to a
per capita income of only about "P535 using the average size of a
household of 5.63s as of 1980.
35. TakenfromtheNEDAStatisticalYearbook,1983.
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TABLE 5.4
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF BASIC MONTHLY SALARY
(N = 3457)
BasicMonthly CumulativeAbsolute Percent
Salary Frequency Percent
iw i
Lessthan 500 150 4.34 4.34
501 - 1,000 474 13.71 18.05
1,001 - 1,500 487 14.09 32.14
1,501 - 2,000 390 11.28 43.42
2,001 - 2,500 224 6.48 49.90
2,501 - 3,000 132 3.82 53.72
3,001 - 3,500 67 1.94 55.66
3,501 - 4,000 35 1.01 56.67
4,001 - 4,500 43 1.24 57.91
4,501 - 5,000 30 0.87 58.78
5,001 - 5,500 20 0.58 59.36
5,501 - 6,000 17 0.49 59.85
6,001 - 6,500 13 0.38 60.23
6,501 - 7,000 11 0.32 60.55
7,001 - 7,500 5 0.14 60.69
7,501 - 8,000 5 0.14 60.83
8,001 - 8,500 4 0.12 60.95
8,501 - 9,000 2 0.06 61.01
9,001 - 9,500 1 0.03 61.04
9,501 - 10,000 10 0.29 61.33
over 10,000 24 0.69 60.02
no response 1,313 37.98 100.00
Averagemonthlyfamily income:1_1,800.96
Source:HDMF,1983
2. The Netlonal Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC)
The NHMFC is a government non-bank financial institution
created in December 1977 with an authorized capital stock of_500
million fully subscribed by the government to increase the availability
of housing loans to homebuyers through the operation of an active
secondary market for home mortgages. It provides a system which
can prime the flow of massive mortgage credits at lower interest rat_
and longer repayment periods tap new fund sources; and increase
private sector participation in home financing.
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NHMFC provides a liquidity mechanism for financial institutions
which extend housing loans under the Pag-IBIG, open housing and
home improvement loan plans and a combination of Pag-IBIG and
open housing or Pag-IBIG, open housing and pari-passu.36 This is
achieved through the continuous purchase of mortgages originated
by these institutions on cash basis. This process relieves the lending
institutions of the risks involved in long-term financing and assures
faster turn-over of loan funds thus allowing them to accommodate
more borrowers.
Funds used to purchase the originated mortgages are generated
by NHMFC through the issuance of Bahayan Mortgage Participation
Certificates (BMPC), a risk-free government security for housing
which are fully and unconditionally guaranteed by the government.
These BMPCs are backed by the pool of mortgages purchased by
NHMFC and held in trust by DBP and a Liquidity Fund which can
also be availed of by the investors through DBP (the trustee bank).
All home mortgages purchased are insured by the Home Financing
Corporation.
Consistent with its mandated objectives, the NHMFC has in 1980
officially "broken through the initial barriers of market wariness for
its newfangled device" (NHMFC Annual Report, ]982). The first
batch of mortgages purchased amounted to _I 9] .39 million in ] 980
and this wasable to finance the purchase of 973 units benefitting 991
Pag-IBIG members (Table 5.5). Only seven originating financial
institutions participated in this activity then. For the same period,
the NHMFC sold _152.82 million worth of Bahayan Mortgage Par-
ticipation Certificates to nine institutional investors. The succeeding
years until 1983 witnessed further increases in the amount and
number of mortgages purchased. By 1983, total outstanding loan
amount made available reached _2.096 billion, serving about 20,623
beneficiaries and financing the purchase of 13,169 units. A remark-
able performance is observed in 1983, as mortgages purchased this
year accounted for 55.3% of the total with 96 originating financial
institutions participating. On the average, mortgages purchased by
the Corporation increased at an annual rate of 124.1%. Similar
growth pattern was also observed in the sale of BMPC, which as of
yearend 1982 amounted to _898.18 million. This marked an increase
of more than 300% over the previous year's total.
3_, A parl-passuloan iseither a Pag-IBIGor open-housingloancombinedwith a regular
loan extendedto the sameborrower by the samelendinginstitutionsand securedby the
samecollateralon a pro-ratabasiswith a portionof the mortgagepurchasedby NHMFC.
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TABLE 5.5
SUMMARY OF MORTGAGE PURCHASESBY TYPE OF LOAN,
1980-1983
Number Number
Amount of of
Beneficiaries Units
1980a
PagllBIG 12,525,363 162 144
Open.Housing 16,364,200 138 138
Pag-IBIGsaBLISS 14,351,971 163 163
Existing Mortgages 148,144,731 528 528
TOTAL 191,386,265 991 963
1981
Pag-IBIG 61,741,305 797 629
Open.Housing 25,465,600 265 219
Pag-IBIGsaBLISS 34,001,143 480 480
Existing Mortgages 27,976,319 126 126
TOTAL 149,184,367 1,668 1,454
1982
Pag-iBIG 418,289,012 6,020 3,711
Open-Housing 103,021,192 1,016 794
Ipag-IBIGsaBLISS 75,873,105 869 669
ExistingMortgages l _ --
TOTA L 597,183,309 7,905 5,174
1983b
Pag-IBIG 931,430,979 8,625 4,887
Open-Housing 202,545,491 1,304 551
Pag-IBIGsaBLISS 24,560,422 130 130
ExistingMortgages - - -
TOTAL 1,158,536,892 10,059 5,568
GRAND TOTAL 2,096,290,833 20,059 13,169
aFIguresarefor March-Decemberperiodonly.
bFiguresarefor January-Septemberonly.
Source:NHMFC.
By the type of loan taken, a high 80.4% of total outstand-
ing loans in 1983 were Pag-IBIG loans (Table _5.6). This marked a
big jump from a small share of 6.5% in 1980. Open housing loans
64
TABLE5.6
PERCENTAGEDISTRIBUTIONOFPURCHASES
BY TYPEOF LOAN
J 1980 1981 1982 1983Pag-IBIG 6.5 41.4 70.0 80.4
OpenHousing 8.6 17.1 17.3 17.5
Pag-IBIGsaBLISS 7.5 22.8 12.7 2.1
ExistingMortgages 77.4 18.7 - -
100.0 100.0 100.0
TOTAL 100.0
also increased from 8.6% to 17.5% during the same period, while
loans for the purchaseof BLISS units declined especiallyafter 1981.
The remarkable increasein the home mortgage loansmadeavail-
able to home borrowers is a milestone in the housing sector. Pre-
viously avoided by private financial institutions, the origination
of housing loans by these same institutions is said to be a reflection
of an emerging sense of involvement of the private sector in the
development efforts of the government. A system of partnership
in providing assistancefor housing to the low and middle income
families hasfinally evolved. However, the total figures may possibly
overstate the achievement of the housing program insofar asgetting
a more active involvement from the private sector is concerned. We
do observe an increasing number of private financial institutions
getting accredited as originating institutions. What these figures do
not give us is an indication that these private institutions do really
provide the bulk of the housingloans.
Table 5.7 summarizesthe extent of participation of the different
accredited originating financial institutions. It is obvious that a bulk
of the loans purchasedby the NHMFC amounting to_1.032 billion
was actually originated by only two government banksand theseare
the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the Development Bank of
the Philippines (DBP). As a proportion of the total purchase,this
amount constitutes 51.64% (Table 5.8). Savings and mortgage
banks originated a total of _374.6 million, averagingabout _62.4
million each, since only six of the seven accredited banks were
involved. Privatedevelopment banks and savingsand loan associations
originated about the same amount. On the average,however, a parti-
cipating private development bank lent _22.9 million while a savings
and loan associationlent only t=9.5 million.
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TABLE 5.7
CUMULATIVE SUMMARY OF MORTGAGE PURCHASES
BY ORIGINATING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
(AS OF SEPTEMBER 18, 1983)
(IN THOUSAND PESOS)
Originating Number Number
Financial Amount Number of of
Institution Beneficiaries Units
i
Government Banks 1,032,486.87 2 14,085 9,142
Commercial Banks 88,102.00 9 990 666
PrivateDevelopment
Banks 229,166.23 16 3,312 1,709
Savingsand Mortgage
Banks 374,594.71 6 3,746 2,281
Savingsand Loans
Associations 228,324.31 24 3,107 1,844
Building and Loans
Associations 16,415.00 1 219 141
InsuranceCompanies 30,461.96 2 634 379
Savingsand Thrift
Banks ....
Investment Houses ....
TOTAL 1,999,551.08 60 26,093 16,162
Source: NHMFC.
TABLE 5.8
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF MORTGAGE PURCHASES
BY ORIGINATING FINANCIAL INSTITUTION
Government Banks 51.64%
Private Banks
o Commercial Banks 4.41'%
o Private Development Banks 11.46%
o Savingsand MortgageBanks 18.73%
o Savingsand Thrift Banks
Savings'andLoansAssociations 11.42%
Buildingand LoansAssociatons 0.82%
InsuranceCompanies 1.52%
InvestmentHouses
TOTA L 100.00%
Source: NHMFC.
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In terms of beneficiaries, government banks served most of the
homebuyers numbering about 14,085. Hence, average loan origi-
nated by these two banks amounted to about _73,304 (Table 5.9).
Other originating financial institutions like the savings and mortgage
banks and private commercial banks appear to have lent higher
amounts on the average. Insurance companies registered the lowest
loan value per borrower. Some care must be taken in interpreting
these figures since a wide range of loan values is possible on account
of the tacking-in system which allows a group of three borrowers to
get a maximum loan of_300,O00. Further, these loan values already
include the open-housing loans.
TABLE 5.9
AVERAGE LOAN PER BORROWER
ORIGINATED BY ORIGINATING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
(AS OF SEPTEMBER 18, 1983)
Originating Financial Average Loan
Institution ('P/borrower)
Government Banks 73,304
Commercial Banks 88,992
PrivateDevelopment Banks 69,193
Savingsand MortgageBanks 99,998
Savingsand LoansAssociations 73,487
Buildingand LoansAssociations 74,954
InsuranceCompanies 48,047
Savingsand Thrift Banks
InvestmentHouses
TOTAL 76,632
Source: NHMFC.
To further explore the extent to which low and middle income
families are truly being served by the program, a sample of 2,006
borrowers has been drawn randomly from the total number of
borrowers as of September 1983. This represented about 8% of
the total borrowers. The selection of the observations was guided
by the overall distribution of mortgages purchased among govern-
ment banks and private financial institutions. Likewise, observations
without complete information or mortgage documents were exclud-
ed. The incidence of mortgages originated in 1982 and 1983
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occurring more frequently than those in previous years was not
accounted for. There was a problem of getting the files of earlier
borrowers since the records were not in order at the time the data
were collected. Finally, information gathered for the purpose of this
study corresponds to the primary borrower only. Based on the
sample selected, the distribution by type of loan approximates the
actual distribution of all the borrowers. Hence, for purposes of this
study, the sample may be considered fairly representative of the
whole population of borrowers.
The distribution of the sample by type of loan was as follows:
Pag-IBIG - 67.2%; open housing - 14.9%; BLISS - 1.3% and
Pag-IBIG with open housng, pari-passu and home improvement-
16.6% (Table 5.10). A big proportion of the loans taken was used
for either acquiring a lot and construction of a residential unit or
construction of a residential unit only, i.e., 75.6% (Table 5.11 ).
TABLE5.10
DISTRIBUTIONBY TYPEOF LOAN
Typeof Loan Number %
OpenHousing 299 14.9
HDMFor Pag-IBIG 1,348 67.2
BLISS 26 1.3
Pag-IBIGwithOpen-Housing 274 13.7
Pari-Passu 11 0.5
HomeImprovementLoan 48 2.4
TOTAL 2,006 100.0
The distribution by the amount of loan borrowed given in Table
5.12 reveals that almost 40% of the loans were below t=100,000.00.
This may be attributed to the initial loan ceiling of t=80,000 which
was subsequently raised to PIO0,000 in 1981. About 32% of the
loans were between @100,000 and _'139,999, and the rest were
thinly distributed within the range f=140,000 and t_299,999.
Nearly 3% fell in the t=300,000 and above category. Tacking-
in was common and this accounts for the relatively high loan values.
Looking at the monthly amortization most of these borrowers
pay and comparing this with family income reveals interesting
observations (Tables 5.13 and 5.14). Only slightly over 9% of the
borrowers pay monthly amortization of f=499 or lower. About 29%
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TABLE S.11
DISTRIBUTION BY PURPOSEOF LOAN
Purpose Number %
Purchaseof an existingresidentialunit
(with previousoccupancy) 206 10.3
Lot purchaseandconstructionof
residentialunit 901 44.9
Constructionof a new residential
unit 616 30.7
Paymentof a longterm residential
lease 35 1.7
Purchaseof a newly constructed
housingunit (first occupancy) 81 4.0
For a BLISS unit or Association
ownedHousingProject 18 0.9
Home Improvement 137 6.8
Open HousingConversion 12 0.6
TOTA L 2,006 100.0
TABLE 5.12
DISTRIBUTION BY AMOUNT OF LOAN SECURED
Amount Cumulative
of Loan Number Percentage Percentage
Below_'100,000 792 39.48 39.48
100,000 - 119,999 424 21.14 60.62
120,000 - 139,999 217 10.82 71.44
140,000 - 159,999 155 7.73 79.17
160,000 - 179,999 100 4.98 84.15
180,000 = 199,999 80 3.99 88.14
200,000 - 219,999 96 4.79 92.93
220,000 - 239,999 32 1.59 94.52
240,000 - 259,999 31 1.54 96.06
260,000 - 279,999 17 0.85 96.91
280,000 - 299,999 5 0.25 97.16
300,000 and above 57 2.84 100.00
TOTAL 2006
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TABLE 5.13
DISTRIBUTION OF MONTHLY AMORTIZATION
Monthly Number Percentage CumulativeAmortization Percentage
Below P250 28 1.39 1.39
250 - 499 159 7.93 9.32
500 - 749 281 14.01 23.33
750 - 999 429 21.39 44.72
1,000 - 1,249 301 15.00 59.72
1,250 - 1,499 229 11.42 71.14
1,500 - 1,749 139 6.93 78.07
1,750 - 1,999 144 7.18 85.25
2,000 - 2,249 71 3.54 88.79
2,250 - 2,499 44 2.19 90.98
2,500 - 2,749 46 2.29 93.27
2,750 - 2,999 39 1.94 i95.21
3,000 - 3,249 37 1.84 97.05
3,250 - 3,499 19 0.95 98.00
3,500 - 3,749 12 0.60 98.60
3,750 - 3,999 8 0.40 99.00
4,000 and above 20 1.00 100.00
TOTA L 2,006
pay _1,500 and above. Surprisingly, 20 borrowers (i.e., 1%) are
paying monthly amortizations of _4,000 and above. The income
table tells us that a relatively small proportion of the borrowers earn
below 1_1,000 a month, i.e., 5.3%. 64% have monthly family incomes
of between t_1,000 and t_4,999. More than 30%, therefore, of the
borrowers are earning t_5,000 and above. This distribution obviously
tells us that low income families who receive _4,000 annually still
do not have access to these loans. Even the figures in Table 5.13
indirectly give the same message. A monthly amortization of _499
would already account for about 50% of a family income oft_1,000
a month. Necessarily, if the monthly amortization should not exceed
25% of family income, then to be able to amortize _499 monthly,
the family should be earning at least t_1,996 monthly. Definitely,
an ordinary worker cannot earn this much.
The above discussion clearly conveys an alarming message. While
the government, through the Pag-IBIG fund, aims to provide more
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TABLE5.14
DISTRIBUTIONBYMONTHLYFAMILY INCOMEa IN 1983
Cumulative
Family Income Number Percentage Percentage
BelowP1,000 107 5.33 5.33
1,000- 1,999 369 18.39 23.72
2,000- 2,999 364 18.15 41.87
3,000- 3,999 361 18.00 59.87
4,000- 4,999 193 9.62 69.49
5,000- 5,999 148 7.38 76.87
6,000- 6,999 123 6.13 83.00
7,000- 7,999 81 4.04 87.04
8,000- 8,999 43 2.14 89.18
9,000- 9,999 76 3.79 92.97
10,000andabove 141 7.03 100.00
TOTAL 2,006
aFamily incomerefersto the sumof the incomesof all family memberslivingtogether
in a dwellingunit andsharingcommonfacilities.
housing opportunities to the low income families, the actual ope-
ration of the lending system does not reach the target population.
Since a large proportion of the Pag-IBIG membership are still the low
and middle income families, it appears that they are ironically
helping the high income families securebetter or more housingunits
through the subsidized Pag-IBIG loans. In fact, it is a common
practice among high income borrowers to apply for a combination of
Pag-IBIG and open-housing loans to increase their loan values way
beyond the maximum amount of _100,000. Instead therefore of
improving the distribution of consumption of housingservicesamong
the less privileged group, the government program is in fact enhan-
cing a more inequitable distribution favoring the better-off.
3. Home Financing Corporation (HFC)
HFC acts as the guarantor of individual loans for homebuilding
through the provision of mortgage credit insurance. An HFC
guarantee carries with it the unconditional guarantee of the govern-
ment of the Philippines. The government, through HFC, is commit-
ted to guarantee up to at least t_15 billion worth of mortgages.
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Construction and Development Finance
Under this scheme,developmentand construction loansextend-
ed by financial institutions to real estate developersand buildersare
guaranteed by the government through HFC. This credit guarantee
and insuranceprovide lending institutionsthe following benefits:
1. Loans guaranteed by HFC are classified as risk-free (HFC
carrieswith it the unconditional guaranteeofthegovernment)
2. Financial institutions can lend beyond their singleborrowers'
limit of 1S% of total networth.
3. Loans are not included in the total computation of DOSRI
accounts.
4. A lending institution's interest income from HFC guaranteed
loans is free from gross receipts tax, and the corporate
income and developmenttaxes.
_;. Lending institutions have the option to charge8.5% tax-free
interestor 14% interest but grossof taxes.
Likewise, developersand individual borrowersderive a bundleof
benefits which would not have been available without the credit
insurance program of HFC. In general, though, this program en-
courages the flow of private funds into housing which normally
would not havebeenmadeavailablebecauseof the high-risknature of
housinginvestments.This consequentlyallows borrowersfor housing
to haveeasieraccessto funding.
Specifically,the other benefits includethe following:
1. Interest income from HFC guarantee-loansare tax exempt
and this amount to 5-6% savingsto the financial institution
which can be passedon to the borrowers through lower
interest and premium charges.
2. Developers can borrow as much as 90% of the value of the
collateral.
3. HFC formulated several service packages to help private
developers in the development of viable housing programs
(e.g., Credit Supervision and Project Management, Bishop's
Housing Program, Trusteeship Arrangement).
Guarantee approvals as of 1982 hit 1_3.1 billion, an increase of
55% from the previous year's t=2 billion. 65% of this amount were
approved guarantees for development loans, while 27% wasfor indi-
vidual housing loans. The number of financial institutions which
availed of HFC guarantee almost doubled from 1981 to 1982, i.e.,
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64 in 1982 from 33 in 1981. By the end of 1982, thirty-one (31)
financial institutions committed t_7.7 billion of their funds for
housing. These included 5 unibanks, 7 local commercial banks, 1
foreign bank and 18 other financial institutions.
Although a more detailed investigation of the performance of
this program is not done in this study, a cursory look at the projects
under the MFC scheme reveals the same bias in favor of the higher
income families. Cost of units put up for sale are still way beyond
the reach of the averagefamily.
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CHAPTER6
CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This study attempts to review and evaluate the housing situation
in the Philippines and the programs introduced by the government,
specifically the shelter finance component of the National Shelter
Program.While it is desirableto considerthe other componentsof the
Program, the unavailability of more detailed information proved to
be a major constraint. The analysis went only as far as the data
availablewarranted it.
The preceding discussionson the housingsituation during the last
three decadespoint to the same old problem of insufficient accept-
able dwelling units for all households. A considerable number of
doubled-up householdsstill exists and the proliferation of unaccept-
able types of dwellings units still remains unabated especially in
NCR. Other problems like the fast rise in the cost of housingand the
low incomes of most of the people were also identified. These ob-
servations stressthe fact that good housing, especially for the low
income groups, remains an unrealized dream and it seemstheir only
chance to gain accessto such a market is through the help of the
government. With the extraordinarily fast rise in the prices of more
basiccommodities like food and clothing today, it is very likely that
lessand lesspeople especiallyamong the fixed-income earners,would
contemplate on increasing their consumption of housing services
either through the purchaseof a houseor expansion of their existing
dwelling units.
Government expenditure on housinghas in fact been increasing.
As of 1983, actual government expenditure on housingand commu-
nity amenities amounted to _2.3 billion and this represented about
2.3% of GNP, asTable 6.1 indicates.
But government resourcesare limited and there is a long list of
other claims on these resources.Housing hasa relatively stable share
to total government expenditure until 1982 after which it showedan
appreciable increaseof 42%.
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TABLE 6,1
ACTUAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE ON HOUSING, 1978-1983
(IN MILLION PESOSAT CONSTANT 1972 PRICES)
Year Expenditure Proportion of Proportion of total (%)
GNP (%) government expenditures
1978 620 0.7 2.25
1979 1,443 1.6 4.37
1980 1,331 1.4 3.47
1981 1,633 1.7 3.53
1982 1,534 1.5 3.14
1983 2,317 2.3 4.47
1984 1,348" 2.46
*preliminary estimate as of February 1984.
Source: Unpublished figures from the Office of Budget and Management, Ministry of the
Budget.
The estimation of the income elesticity of demand for housing
for a particular market mainly composed of middle and low income
families revealed a highly income inelastic demand. The low elasticity
estimate probably suggests that people in this particular market do
not really have a choice. They may be constrained to spend any
additional income they get on more pressing and basic needs like
food. In effect, it should not be interpreted as an indication of the
people's lower preference for housing. This result also seems to
suggest that very little effect on the consumption of housing services
results from any form of income subsidy. Likewise, demand was also
found to be highly price inelastic especially among renters. There
may have been some bias in this result since it is possible that some
of the occupied rented units were covered by the rent control law.
Further analysis is therefore required using better quality and more
detailed data.
Finally, the review of the country's past housing programs
revealed the weaknesses inherent in these programs which resulted
in their failure. Some programs were indeed intended to help the
poor get better housing facilities, but little success was achieved on
account of the absence of coordination among the different housing
agencies and inefficient management. In the case of the National
Shelter Program, which is still on its 6th year of operation, some
success is already manifested in terms of its ability to develop the
secondary mortgage market. It is true that its Shelter Finance
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Program, which has somehow succeeded in involving the private
sector more actively in the housing sector, hasbenefitted more than
26,000 homeowners (as of September 1983). What it hasfailed to
achieve so far is the fulfillment of its promise to the bulk of the
people who contribute a portion of their salary monthly to the fund
which helps finance housing activities. The figures presented in
Chapter 5 tell ussuccinctly that the poor families are still deprived
of housing loans not because there are explicit rules against their
borrowing but becauseof their low incomes,high housing prices and
some implicit barriers in the lending process itself. These implicit
barriers includethe red tape involved in the processingof the loan
which may consume many working hoursof an ordinary worker and
the relatively high amortization rates. What is more disheartening is
the fact that some high-income borrowers avail of these loans to
finance the acquisition of more housing units, which they may use
for purposesother than living in them.
Resourcesfor housing may be growing but the allocation is defi-
nitely not socially desirable.The Pag-IBIG fund, for example, isa way
of redistributing private resources to the housing sector since the
employer is mandated to give a counterpart contribution to the fund.
However, with the way loansare being taken out, these resourcesare
ploughed back into the hands of the better-off. What hasbeenenvi-
sioned to solve the gap between need and supply may end up as a
source of the widening of this gap, especially among the low and
middle income groups.
What can bedone then?
In view of the difficulty of major reallocations of scarce re-
sourcesin favor of housing and lack of accessby the poor to the
market, policy should be directed at more efficient and equitable
intra-sector allocation of resourcespresently devoted to housing.This
means that emphasis in public programs should be placed on truly
low-cost housing. Models adopted from other countries are expen-
sive, and while they may satisfy our aesthetic norms, they normally
would not be accessibleto the needy. The effort therefore to come up
with local models using indigenous materials should be more vigor-
ously pursued. This should also be accompanied by an active land
development program in order to minimize the rate of increase in
land values. In addition to these two programs, what can possibly be
introduced is a scheme where core units are initially provided at a
much lower cost. Self-help activities can then be initiated by the
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occupants themselves to upgrade the unit. This idea of "sweat
equity" built up in the production of their dwelling units, although
•perhapsdone very gradually, is expectedto encouragethe owners to
further improve their home condition. The government can then
assist in this program by providing the necessary public services,
notably sanitary facilities.
Resourcesof the NHMFC available to finance the operation of
the secondarymarket for home mortgagesseem to havefallen short
of its intended disbursementslately. From Juneto Decemberof this
year, the Corporation hopes to purchasef'l,200 million worth of
mortgages.Pag-IBIG collections projected for the sameperiod would
not be enough to finance NHMFC's disbursements.Also, the saleof
BMPCs has reacheda standstill. The interest rate subsidyprogram37
to be implemented by the NHMFC may not also really attract takers
on account of liquidity problems faced by many financial institu-
tions today. On account of this difficulty, interest rateson housing
loans are expected to be increased.Very recently, the NHMFC also
announced that it plans to finance the funding gap through short
term borrowings and the flotation of guaranteed passthrough certi-
ficates (GPTC).
The heart of the problem seems to lie in the inability of the
program to generate enough savingsfor housing.What is perhaps
critical is the HDMF's campaign for more self-employed and self-
paying members. These are the people who may have the funds to
saveand yet may not be in need of housingloans.Likewise, members
should be encouragedto take out smaller loans basically for house
improvement purposes.Borrowing to build another house is really
taking away from three or four low-income borrowers the opportu-
nity to acquire housing.
Undoubtedly, the housing sector can contribute significantly
to the social and economicdevelopment of the country. Its effects
on employment, output, balanceof payments, etc. should therefore
be carefully studied. However, such effort cannot be realized unless
more information on housing will be collected. It Us, therefore,
recommended that a regular housingsurvey similar to what is being
done in the United Statesbe conducted in the near future. Likewise,
37. This program calls for participating banks to hold on to at least 60% of total mort-
gages to be originated by them for a total period of about 5 years. Duringthis period, banks
shall be given supplemental interest incomes on top of the regular income to be generated
by the mortgage assets. For a period of 5 years, the program shall require a budgetary allo-
cation of_1.7 billion.
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housing agencies should have more active researchgroups which can
probably do collaborative research on housing with other agencies.
This will also encourage eachagencyto develop a system of monitor-
ing basic housing-related information like land values and housing
cost, which can be obtained readily.
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ANNEX A
LIST OF ORIGINATING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
GOVERNMENT BANKS
1. Development Bank of the Philippines
2. Philippine National Bank
3. Land Bank of the Philippines
4. Philippine Veterans Bank
COMMERCIAL BANKS
1. Allied Banking Corporation
2. China Banking Corporation
3. Equitable Banking Corporation
4. Family Bank and Trust Company
5. Philippine Banking Corporation
6. Rizal Commercial BankingCorporation
7. Security Bank and Trust Company
8. Traders Royal Bank
9. United Coconut PlantersBank
10. Union Bank of the Philippines
11. International Corporate Bank
] 2. Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank
13. Insular Bank of Asia and America
14. Manila Banking Corporation
15. ConsolidatedBank and Trust Company
16. Prudential Bank
17. Commercial Bank of Manila
18. Republic PlantersBank
PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT BANKS
1. BacolodCity Development Bank
2. Bangko Makati
3. BataanDevelopment Bank
4. Capitol City Development Bank
79
5. Cavite Development Bank
6. Cebu City Development Bank (Banco Cebuano)
7. Davao City Development Bank (Banco Davao)
8. Development Bank of Rizal
9. Luzon Development Bank
10. Northern Mindanao Development Bank
11. Peninsula Development Bank
12. People's Development Bank
13. Planters Development Bank
14. Premiere Development Bank
15. Quezon City Development Bank (Asiatrust)
16. Quezon Development Bank
17. Second Laguna Development Bank
18. Second Pampanga Development Bank
19. Southern Negros Development Bank
20. Tarlac Development Bank
21. Urban Development Bank
22. Dumaguete City Development Bank
23. Lipa City Development Bank
24. Quezon City Development Bank
SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS
1. Admiral United SavingsBank
:2. Asian Savings Bank
3. BalangaSavingsAssociation
4. Builders Savingsand Loan Association
5. City SavingsBank
6. Daily SavingsBank
7. Davao Savingsand Loan Association
8. Domestic Savingsand Loan Association
9. Farmers Savingsand Loan Association
10. First Savingsand Loan Association
11. First Iligan Savingsand Loan Association
12. Fortune Savingsand Loan Association
13. Homeowners Savingsand Loan Association
14. Hermosa Savingsand Loan Association
15. Iloilo Savingsand Loan Association
16. Intercity Savingsand Loan Association
17. International Savingsand Loan Association
18. Legaspi Savingsand Loan Association
8O
19. Liberty Savingsand Loan Association
20. Life Savingsand Loan Association
21. MarivelesSavingsand Loan Association
22. Maunlad Savingsand Loan Association
23. MerchantsSavingsand Loan Association
24. MolaveSavingsand Loan Association
25. Paluwaganng Bayan Savingsand Loan Association
26. PangasinanSavingsand Loan Association
27. Permanent Savingsand Loan Association
28. Perpetual Savingsand Loan Association
29. PioneerSavingsand Loan Association
30. Reliable Savingsand Loan Association
31. Royal SavingsBank
32. SandiganSavingsand Loan Association
33. SummaSavingsand Loan Association(Regent)
34. Town Savingsand Loan Association
35 University Savingsand Loan Association
36. Pag-asaSavingsand Loan Association
BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATION
1. Manila Buildingand Loan Association
INSURANCE COMPANIES
1. AFP-MBAI
2. United Coconut PlantersLife AssuranceCorporation
3. Pioneer Life AssuranceCorporation
FINANCE COMPANI ES
1. FNCB Finance
INVESTMENT HOUSES
1. Ayala Investment and Development Corporation
2. Anscor Capital Investment Corporation
SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANKS
1. Bancode Oro Savingsand MortgageBank
2. Banco Filipino Savingsand MortgageBank
3. PAIC
4. Home SavingsBank and Trust Company
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5. Monte de PiedadSavingsBank
6. SavingsBank of Manila
7. Philippine SavingsBank
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ANNEX B1
TOTAL NUMBER AND COSTPER SQUARE METER OF SINGLE RESIDENTIAL UNITS
CONSTRUCTEDBY REGION, 1977-1983
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983"
Total # Cost Total # Cost Total # Cost Total # Cost Total # Cost Total # Cost Total # Cost
RegionI t,787 260 661 442 931 647 857 819 1,113 866 959 885 678 965
Region [I 848 236 284 484 415 620 538 759 467 852 414 868 279 907
Region III 1,406 380 1,069 566 1,844 678 1,561 872 2,T57 962 2,516 1,050 1,465 |,034
oo RegionIV 3,484 396 t,586 601 2,244 723 2,741 847 2,622 945 2,693 1,058 1,888 1,083
_o RegionV 725 300 385 433 505 615 571 741 563 865 433 929 457 1,066
RegionVI 1,163 356 1,122 516 1,t77 614 1,100 788 1,052 879 771 913 487 922
Region Vll 1,831 402 801 507 1,328 548 985 703 1,355 813 1,396 803 704 810
Region V lit 1,046 176 473 491 679 581 772 720 872 754 643 781 498 1,053
RegionIX 943 236 709 485 719 6t8 679 767 532 781 378 846 218 849
Region X 2,116 242 813 379 1,083 522 1,004 804 1,224 720 890 735 460 737
RegionXI 1,432 347 t,177 531 1,522 694 1,576 840 2,414 867 2,818 922 1,661 986
Region XI[ 634 284 376 404 790 615 70t 783 569 790 464 823 274 919
NCR 3,727 726 4,224 844 6,162 952 6,376 1,064 6,811 1,186 9,567 1,229 6,759 1,179
PHILIPPINES21,142 465 13,680 657 I9,399 768 19,46I 912 21,75t 996 23,942 1,080 t5,828 1,086
*Forthefirsttwoquartersonly.
ANNEX B2
TOTAL NUMBER AND COST PER SQUARE METER OF DUPLEX UNITS
CONSTRUCTED BY REGION, 1977-1983
1977 1978 1979 1980 t981 1982 1983"
Total# Cost Total# Cost Total# Cost Total# Cost Total# Cost Total# Cost Total# Cost
Region I t45 521 13 475 129 619 60 865 37 845 39 798 32 845
Region II 83 256 12 506 36 588 65 686 33 790 18 838 14 864
Region III 36 353 26 586 92 648 70 826 126 894 156 899 147 1,067
Region IV 158 394 64 534 89 744 172 811 1 30 t,024 113 i,061 118 1,069
._
Region V 4_5 245 10 609 20 603 43 693 22 846 24 932 30 956
Region Vl 62 301 31 484 53 606 32 732 27 897 26 644 35 993
Region V ll 49 353 41 402 100 521 48 655 34 688 34 738 24 810
Region Vlll 51 234 16 480 43 500 35 713 19 861 35 723 13 760
Region IX $8 224 22 537 64 567 33 546 34 517 1:.5 852 13 837
Region X 134 282 49 379 85 490 70 574 25 680 24 603 17 988
Region Xl 58 249 27 51 3 73 718 66 801 85 721 110 863 27 941
Region XII 28 264 21 406 48 592 63 682 23 759 15 632 11 782
NCR 21t 744 254 338 548 936 515 998 507 1,122 616 1,171 703 1,286
PHILIPPINES 1,118 480 586 369 1,380 774 1,272 869 1,102 987 1,225 1,030 1,184 1,174
_For thefirst two quartersonly.
ANNEX B3
TOTAL NUMBER AND COST PER SQUARE METER OF APARTMENTSIACCESSORIA
CONSTRUCTED BY REGION, 1977-1983
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983"
Total # Cost Total # Cost Total # Cost Total # Cost Total # Cost Total # Cost Total # Cost
Region I 13 1,725 7 584 18 197 14 t,313 17 1,066 20 1,037 9 957
Region II 16 377 8 514 24 714 19 863 14 980 7 818 2 702
Region I[I 45 305 25 498 37 724 39 687 55 754 65 767 44 869
oo Region IV 85 338 43 445 42 610 60 840 77 880 57 1,623 40 921u_
Region V 12 436 10 599 14 635 12 759 8 1,266 13 851 8 945
Region V I 5 452 13 420 9 368 6 611 5 850 4 849 1 1,085
Region VII 25 500 17 464 32 1,955 17 663 10 820 21 848 7 795
Region VIII 5 219 4 443 16 285 15 599 4 748 5 519 2 661
Region {X 1 285 10 580 16 773 14 708 6 967 2 528 5 757
Region X 34 443 17 538 21 297 9 733 12 605 8 975 3 648
Region XI 22 306 19 377 175 1,170 14 752 10 613 11 872 5 750
Region X II 9 456 19 358 11 374 12 650 17 668 5 741 2 1,000
NCR 320 404 343 959 447 1,154 508 1,169 460 1,095 766 1,074 328 1,109
PHILIPPINES 592 410 535 805 862 968 739 1,080 695 1,046 984 1,081 456 1,065
*For the first two quarters only.
ANNEX C
DEFINITION OF TERMS AND CONCEPTS
Dwelling Unit: a separate and independent place of abode intended
for habitation or one not intended for habitation but occupied
as living quarters by a household at the time of the census. In
most places in the country a dwelling unit is a house. It may be
an apartment, a group of rooms or just one room, a barong-
barong, boat or cave.
Types of buildings
Single house - a complete structure intended for a single family or
household
Duplex - a structure intended for two households with complete
living facilities for each. It is a single structure divided into two
dwelling units by a wall extending from the floor to the ceiling.
Apartment or Accesoria - a structure usually of several stories, made
up of independent quarters with independent entrance from
internal halls or courts. An accesoria is a one or two-floor struc-
ture divided into several dwelling units, each dwelling unit having
its own separateentrance from outside.
Barong-barong - a shack or makeshift shelter, usually built with light
materials.
Commercial building - a building used for trade and commerce such
as a store or an office buidling.
Industrial building - a building used for processing or manufacturing,
such as a factory plant.
Agricultural building -- any structure used for agriculture purposes,
such as barn_ warehouse, etc.
Institutional building - a hospital, school, church, etc.
Others - any structure which does not fall into any of the above
classification.
Type of Tenure
Owner occupied only - a dwelling unit where the owner is one of
the persons living in the unit even if he is temporarily absent.
Rented only - if rent is paid or contracted for by occupants, in cash
or in kind.
Occupied rent free - a dwelling unit which is occupied by a house-
hold.
These are standard NCSO definitions.
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